<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" ><generator uri="https://jekyllrb.com/" version="3.10.0">Jekyll</generator><link href="https://jindaldigest.github.io/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" /><link href="https://jindaldigest.github.io/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" /><updated>2025-04-24T07:10:04+00:00</updated><id>https://jindaldigest.github.io/feed.xml</id><title type="html">Jindal Digest for Competition and Innovation Laws</title><subtitle>JDCIL is a student run, peer reviewed blog, tracing developments in Competition and Technology Law and Policy.</subtitle><author><name>Jindal Digest</name><email>jindaldigest@gmail.com</email></author><entry><title type="html">The News Reels Blog!</title><link href="https://jindaldigest.github.io/2024/02/26/the-news-reels-blog/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="The News Reels Blog!" /><published>2024-02-26T11:17:11+00:00</published><updated>2024-02-26T11:17:11+00:00</updated><id>https://jindaldigest.github.io/2024/02/26/the-news-reels-blog</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://jindaldigest.github.io/2024/02/26/the-news-reels-blog/"><![CDATA[<p><strong>REPORT TITLE</strong></p>

<p>LOREM IPSUM DOLOR SIT AMET</p>

<p><img src="" alt="horizontal line" /></p>

<h1 id="introduction">Introduction</h1>

<p>Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetuer adipiscing elit, sed diam nonummy nibh euismod tincidunt ut laoreet dolore magna aliquam erat volutpat. Ut wisi enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exerci tation ullamcorper suscipit lobortis nisl ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis autem vel eum iriure dolor in hendrerit in vulputate velit esse molestie consequat, vel illum dolore eu feugiat nulla facilisis at vero eros et accumsan.</p>

<h2 id="lorem-ipsum">Lorem ipsum</h2>

<p>Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetuer adipiscing elit, sed diam nonummy nibh euismod tincidunt ut laoreet dolore magna aliquam erat volutpat. Ut wisi enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exerci tation ullamcorper suscipit lobortis nisl ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis autem vel eum iriure dolor in hendrerit in vulputate velit esse molestie consequat, vel illum dolore eu feugiat nulla facilisis at vero eros et accumsan. Nam liber tempor cum soluta nobis eleifend option congue nihil imperdiet doming id quod mazim placerat facer possim assum. Typi non habent claritatem insitam; est usus legentis in iis qui facit eorum claritatem. Investigationes demonstraverunt lectores legere me lius quod ii legunt saepius.</p>

<p>Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetuer adipiscing elit, sed diam nonummy nibh euismod tincidunt ut laoreet dolore magna aliquam erat volutpat. Ut wisi enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exerci tation ullamcorper suscipit lobortis nisl ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.</p>

<h3 id="dolor-sit-amet">Dolor sit amet</h3>

<p>Nam liber tempor cum soluta nobis eleifend option congue nihil imperdiet doming id quod mazim placerat facer possim assum. Typi non habent claritatem insitam; est usus legentis in iis qui facit eorum claritatem. Investigationes demonstraverunt lectores legere me lius quod ii legunt saepius. Duis autem vel eum iriure dolor in hendrerit in vulputate velit esse molestie consequat, vel illum dolore eu feugiat nulla facilisis at vero eros et accumsan.</p>]]></content><author><name>Jindal Digest</name></author><category term="blogs" /><category term="contributors" /><category term="Tech" /><category term="News-Reels" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Read our latest legal insights and analysis from expert contributors.]]></summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://unsplash.it/1200/800?image=1065" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://unsplash.it/1200/800?image=1065" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">Reserve Bank of India’s Clarifications to Data Localisation Order: Addressing Controversies and Concerns</title><link href="https://jindaldigest.github.io/2024/02/26/Reserve-Bank-of-India's-Clarifications-to-Data-Localisation-Order-Addressing-Controversies-and-Concerns/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Reserve Bank of India’s Clarifications to Data Localisation Order: Addressing Controversies and Concerns" /><published>2024-02-26T11:17:11+00:00</published><updated>2024-02-26T11:17:11+00:00</updated><id>https://jindaldigest.github.io/2024/02/26/Reserve-Bank-of-India&apos;s-Clarifications-to-Data-Localisation-Order-Addressing-Controversies-and-Concerns</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://jindaldigest.github.io/2024/02/26/Reserve-Bank-of-India&apos;s-Clarifications-to-Data-Localisation-Order-Addressing-Controversies-and-Concerns/"><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/jindaldigest.weebly.com/blog-781581/reserve-bank-of-indias-clarifications-to-data-localisation-order-addressing-controversies-and-concerns"><strong>Reserve Bank of India's Clarifications to Data Localisation Order:
Addressing Controversies and
Concerns</strong></a></p>

<p><strong>By Gayatri Kasibhatta</strong></p>

<p>The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) recently
issued <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/www.moneycontrol.com/news/economy/policy/rbi-issues-clarifications-on-data-localisation-circular-4141331.html">clarifications </a>to
its Data Localisation Order (the Order), a move that has generated
significant discussion and debate.
The <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=11244&amp;Mode=0">Order</a> requires
all data related to payment systems to be stored in India, a measure
that has been viewed by many as a controversial move by the central
bank.
The <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=11244&amp;Mode=0">Order</a> has
been in place since April 2018, when the RBI mandated that all payment
system providers in India must ensure that payment transaction data is
stored in India. The Order was seen as a measure to boost cybersecurity
and protect consumer data. It was applicable to all payment system
providers, including banks, payment gateways, and payment aggregators.
However, it
generated <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/singhania.in/blog/all-about-data-localisation-in-india">controversy</a> almost
immediately, with many stakeholders in the payment system industry,
including multinational companies, expressing concern that the
requirement to store data in India would add unnecessary costs, create
data duplication, and reduce efficiency. In addition, there were
concerns that the Order would create barriers to entry for foreign
companies looking to enter the Indian market.</p>

<p>​In response to these concerns, the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/m.rbi.org.in/scripts/FAQView.aspx?Id=130#:~:text=In%20case%20the%20processing%20is,be%20stored%20only%20in%20India.">RBI issued
clarifications</a> to
the Order in June 2019. The clarifications aim to address some of the
concerns that have been raised, while maintaining the overall goal of
protecting consumer data. The RBI’s clarifications provide more detail
on the requirements for data storage in India. Specifically, the RBI
has <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/m.rbi.org.in/scripts/FAQView.aspx?Id=130#:~:text=In%20case%20the%20processing%20is,be%20stored%20only%20in%20India.">clarified</a> that
payment system providers are required to store the entire data related
to payment systems in a system that is located only in India. This means
that payment system providers must ensure that the primary data storage
systems, as well as any backup systems, are located in India. The RBI
has
also <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/m.rbi.org.in/scripts/FAQView.aspx?Id=130#:~:text=In%20case%20the%20processing%20is,be%20stored%20only%20in%20India.">clarified</a> that
payment system providers are allowed to store a copy of the data outside
of India, for the purposes of business continuity or disaster recovery.
However, the RBI has emphasized that the copy of the data stored outside
of India must
be <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/PublicationReportDetails.aspx?UrlPage=&amp;ID=1189">encrypted</a>,
and that the data must be deleted from the offshore location as soon as
it is no longer required.<br />
 <br />
Another important clarification made by
the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=12136&amp;Mode=0">RBI</a> is
with respect to data storage arrangements between payment system
providers and third-party service providers. The RBI
has <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/www.rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=11244">clarified</a> that
payment system providers must ensure that all data related to payment
systems is stored only in India, even if the storage is done by a
third-party service provider. In other words, payment system
providers <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/www.rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=11244">cannot outsource data
storage</a> to
a service provider located outside of India. These clarifications
address some of the concerns raised by stakeholders in the payment
system industry. For example, the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/PublicationReportDetails.aspx?ID=278">RBI’s clarification on the use of
backup
systems</a> located
outside of India will help reduce concerns about data duplication and
redundancy. The clarification on data storage arrangements with
third-party service providers will help ensure that all payment system
providers are held to the same standards, regardless of whether they use
a third-party service provider. However, there are still some concerns
about the Order that <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/www.nishithdesai.com/Content/document/pdf/Articles/190122_A_All_You_Need_to_Know_About_RBI_Data_Localisation_Directive.pdf">have not been
addressed</a> by
the RBI’s clarifications. For example,
some <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/www.nishithdesai.com/Content/document/pdf/Articles/190122_A_All_You_Need_to_Know_About_RBI_Data_Localisation_Directive.pdf">critics</a> argue
that the Order is a protectionist measure that will create barriers to
entry for foreign companies looking to enter the Indian market. Others
argue that it will lead to unnecessary costs and reduced efficiency for
payment system providers.<br />
 <br />
Despite these concerns,
the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/thewire.in/business/rbi-payment-data-localisation-india">RBI claims</a> that
the Order is necessary to ensure the security of consumer data. The RBI
has pointed to several recent data breaches in India, including the
breach of the Aadhaar database, which contained the personal information
of over 1.1 billion Indians.
The <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/technology/data-localisation-was-never-a-mandate-in-india-it-mos-chandrasekhar/articleshow/97144650.cms">RBI argues</a> that
the Order will help prevent similar breaches from occurring in the
future. The RBI’s clarifications to the Order have been welcomed by some
in the payment system industry, who see them as a step towards reducing
uncertainty and clarifying the requirements for compliance. However,
others argue that the clarifications do not go far enough in addressing
the concerns of the industry and may still pose challenges for payment
system providers.<br />
 <br />
For example, the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/law.asia/price-of-protection/">cost of
complying</a> with
the Order may be significant, particularly for smaller payment system
providers. In addition, the requirement to store data only in India may
create operational challenges, particularly for multinational companies
that operate in multiple jurisdictions. These challenges may lead to
reduced efficiency and increased costs for payment system providers.
Furthermore,
some <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/carnegieindia.org/2021/04/14/how-would-data-localization-benefit-india-pub-84291">experts</a> argue
that the Order may not be effective in achieving its stated goal of
protecting consumer data.
They <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/carnegieindia.org/2021/04/14/how-would-data-localization-benefit-india-pub-84291">argue</a> that
data breaches can occur regardless of where data is stored, and that the
most effective way to protect data is to implement strong cybersecurity
measures and best practices.<br />
 <br />
In summary, the RBI’s clarifications to the Data Localisation Order have
provided more detail on the requirements for data storage in India,
which has been welcomed by some in the payment system industry.
However, <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/www.mondaq.com/india/privacy-protection/736934/the-debate--data-localization-and-its-efficacy">concerns</a> about
the cost and operational challenges of complying with the Order, as well
as doubts about its effectiveness in protecting consumer data, continue
to be raised. As the
industry <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230320153248/https:/www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/payments-data-must-be-stored-in-systems-located-in-india-says-rbi-119062700043_1.html">adapts</a> to
the new requirements, it remains to be seen how the Data Localisation
Order will impact the payment system industry in India, and whether it
will achieve its intended goals of improving cybersecurity and
protecting consumer data.</p>]]></content><author><name>Jindal Digest</name></author><category term="blogs" /><category term="editors" /><category term="Tech" /><category term="Personal" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Read our latest legal insights and analysis from expert contributors.]]></summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://imagekit.io/tools/asset-public-link?detail=%7B%22name%22%3A%22screenshot_1740561526632.png%22%2C%22type%22%3A%22image%2Fpng%22%2C%22signedurl_expire%22%3A%222028-02-26T09%3A18%3A47.884Z%22%2C%22signedUrl%22%3A%22https%3A%2F%2Fmedia-hosting.imagekit.io%2F%2F7d8b50608b0342bd%2Fscreenshot_1740561526632.png%3FExpires%3D1835169528%26Key-Pair-Id%3DK2ZIVPTIP2VGHC%26Signature%3DmKa1xm4WJZghxKiCWMDXzbmDPaDxlfdEdR9MQKbtL7k0GJgl2kWFtBtCgNllrhBmFENqzmMJEzE8pn9nOaJ~Xbopa35ngmWyBKTJY9Fs~RPAs-p4SCgG62bnYMqQC2~aG8nh~laXCdWVZMPTTXBf0TjtaGcJG25MIQvHpPScQHkOl9BKBP3AvDJcFz0gIGW3iWdva078ZoSJ0TCARcgH-vHG9WxIafb-xCBhPN0fLVlwQnIWXRLQIWWYmJNUUeT0DBvnXcOxWjZS4-IushILA-sjWiXKxEGwJhdtt7Cn-AnbJofQNObw--6uEMtJE95U2755yZMPuEM7revvT5nCHw__%22%7D" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://imagekit.io/tools/asset-public-link?detail=%7B%22name%22%3A%22screenshot_1740561526632.png%22%2C%22type%22%3A%22image%2Fpng%22%2C%22signedurl_expire%22%3A%222028-02-26T09%3A18%3A47.884Z%22%2C%22signedUrl%22%3A%22https%3A%2F%2Fmedia-hosting.imagekit.io%2F%2F7d8b50608b0342bd%2Fscreenshot_1740561526632.png%3FExpires%3D1835169528%26Key-Pair-Id%3DK2ZIVPTIP2VGHC%26Signature%3DmKa1xm4WJZghxKiCWMDXzbmDPaDxlfdEdR9MQKbtL7k0GJgl2kWFtBtCgNllrhBmFENqzmMJEzE8pn9nOaJ~Xbopa35ngmWyBKTJY9Fs~RPAs-p4SCgG62bnYMqQC2~aG8nh~laXCdWVZMPTTXBf0TjtaGcJG25MIQvHpPScQHkOl9BKBP3AvDJcFz0gIGW3iWdva078ZoSJ0TCARcgH-vHG9WxIafb-xCBhPN0fLVlwQnIWXRLQIWWYmJNUUeT0DBvnXcOxWjZS4-IushILA-sjWiXKxEGwJhdtt7Cn-AnbJofQNObw--6uEMtJE95U2755yZMPuEM7revvT5nCHw__%22%7D" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">The Need For A Sustainable Competition Policy</title><link href="https://jindaldigest.github.io/2024/02/26/THE-NEED-FOR-A-SUSTAINABLE-COMPETITION-POLICY/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="The Need For A Sustainable Competition Policy" /><published>2024-02-26T11:17:11+00:00</published><updated>2024-02-26T11:17:11+00:00</updated><id>https://jindaldigest.github.io/2024/02/26/THE-NEED-FOR-A-SUSTAINABLE-COMPETITION-POLICY</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://jindaldigest.github.io/2024/02/26/THE-NEED-FOR-A-SUSTAINABLE-COMPETITION-POLICY/"><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606074937/https:/jindaldigest.weebly.com/blog-781581/the-need-for-a-sustainable-competition-policy"><strong>THE NEED FOR A SUSTAINABLE COMPETITION
POLICY</strong></a></p>

<p><strong>By Keerthana Shroff</strong></p>

<p>INTRODUCTION:<br />
 <br />
In 2015, the United Nations stated that a universal call to action was
integral, to ensure that by 2030, all people on the planet would enjoy
peace and prosperity. This call was formulated in the shape of
the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/www.undp.org/sustainable-development-goals?utm_source=EN&amp;utm_medium=GSR&amp;utm_content=US_UNDP_PaidSearch_Brand_English&amp;utm_campaign=CENTRAL&amp;c_src=CENTRAL&amp;c_src2=GSR&amp;gclid=Cj0KCQiAz9ieBhCIARIsACB0oGKdgcyR5IB1-IPriXtHRwFKAxuqGfzPdHXyuu3ty850xBt3tYEEKVAaAnwAEALw_wcB">Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs)</a>;
17 Global Goals that were said to balance social, economic and
environmental sustainability, while working towards
development. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/5839GSDR%202015_SD_concept_definiton_rev.pdf">Sustainable
development</a> essentially
requires for development to meet the needs of the present while also
maintaining the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.
According to the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/5987our-common-future.pdf">Bruntland Commission
Report</a>, ”Our
Common Future”, sustainable development requires looking at
 environmental policy and economic development strategies from a
intersectional perspective so as to sustain exhaustible resources and
ensure that the environment is minimally exploited  as a result of
economic development. The <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/5839GSDR%202015_SD_concept_definiton_rev.pdf">objectives of the
SDGs</a>,
which is the long-term stability of the environment and economy, can
only be brought to fruition by taking into account environmental,
economic and social factors into the decision making processes of
countries, vis a vis development.<br />
​<br />
In recent years, conversation has been growing about employing
competition law and policy to achieve the SDGs. This has prompted
competition authorities to contemplate the viability of this approach. A
sustainable competition policy framework can curb anti-competitive
practices and <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tdrbpconf8d6_en.pdf">promote sustainable
development</a>.
This article will examine the implementation of such a policy by
studying approaches taken by countries within the EU, and  compare
India's sustainable competition policy approach with it.</p>

<p>WHY COMPETITION POLICY?<br />
<br />
Economists have <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/epdf/10.1093/reep/rex013">traditionally
believed</a> that
environmental regulations increase costs for businesses and reduce
productivity, leading to a potential loss of competitiveness for
domestic companies. Furthermore, according to conventional economic
thinking, if environmental policies vary between countries, it puts some
firms at a disadvantage compared to their foreign counterparts.<br />
<br />
 Although this is the case, recent studies on the viability of
competition policy changes resulting in favourable changes concerning
sustainable development have shown that competition policy, if designed
appropriately based on the social, economic and environmental
considerations of a country, supplement other governmental policies that
support sustainable development. Amongst numerous instances, <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/www.kkv.fi/uploads/sites/2/2021/12/nordic-report-2010-competition-policy-and-green-growth.pdf">Nordic
Competition
Agencies</a> have
examined the intersection between competition and environmental policy,
while emphasizing the value of effective competition policy for
environmental growth. Market conditions framed around sustainable
development, supported by competition policy lead firms in a market to
heighten innovation, widen consumer choice and increase product quality;
thereby allowing firms to sustain higher efficiency. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_e.htm">It has been seen
that</a> these
conditions have the possibility of leading firms to produce safer,
healthier, sustainable and more ethical products that satisfy the need
of more environmentally conscious customers.<br />
<br />
<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tdrbpconf8d6_en.pdf">Competition
policy</a> enhances
efficiency, fosters innovation and expands product options while
improving quality, leading to better consumer welfare. It also helps
regulate the actions of companies. Competition law is classically used
through the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP(2020)3&amp;docLanguage=En">sword and shield
paradigm.</a> In
the context of sustainability, competition law can be manipulated as a
“sword” to promote the former, so long as provisions are not inferred in
a way that is harmful from a sustainability point of view. Lastly,
competition law can be used to <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tdrbpconf8d6_en.pdf">reconcile anti-competitive
impacts</a> with
policies aimed at promoting sustainability, or exempt such measures from
competition law restrictions if they advance sustainability.<br />
 <br />
SUSTAINABLE COMPETITION LAW POLICIES AROUND THE WORLD<br />
 <br />
 THE EUROPEAN UNION<br />
<br />
Post the 2030 Agenda for SDGs and the Paris Agreement, the EU instituted
the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en">European Green
Deal</a>,
which has been considered its foremost force in realising the UN SDGs.
In the European Commission’s <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/awards.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/kdak21001enn.en_1_.pdf?73625/9ca97e9ef4992ce50098e0e5134604780fe40db87d765e13a0f8d09f67cc5780">competition policy brief in September
2021</a>,
special emphasis was laid upon how the success of environmentally
focused policies depends on market compliance to these new regulations
and incentives, while driving innovation through intense and fair
competition among firms.  It was noted that competition law is <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/awards.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/kdak21001enn.en_1_.pdf?73625/9ca97e9ef4992ce50098e0e5134604780fe40db87d765e13a0f8d09f67cc5780">not
applicable in a political
vacuum</a>,
and therefore, competition policy must change in accordance with the
implementation of the SDG principles and the EU Green Deal. Various
stakeholders emphasised the necessity to reduce funding for fossil fuel
producers via State aid and called for a pervasive evaluation of
environmental impact assessment procedures. The participants of the
conference recognised the importance of antitrust enforcement in the
context of sustainability; antitrust enforcement supports sustainability
by promoting fair competition and protecting against anticompetitive
practices. This leads to cost-reflective pricing and incentivizes
companies to find efficient, sustainable solutions. The Commission plans
to enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in all sectors, to ensure European
consumers have access to high-quality products at competitive prices.
Finally, regarding merger control, the respondents and participants
contemplated upon the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/0-107-6174?transitionType=Default&amp;contextData=(sc.Default)&amp;firstPage=true#:~:text=The%20EUMR%20requires%20compulsory%20and,and%20meet%20certain%20turnover%20thresholds.">European Merger Regulation
(EUMR)</a> and
how its enforcement would be in tandem with the European Green Deal. In
March 2021, the Commission adopted guidance for the use of the referral
mechanism between Member States and the Commission under Article 22 of
the EUMR, to encourage more referrals, even for transactions that don't
meet national thresholds. This revised approach is meant to address gaps
in enforcement for acquisitions of new competitors, which may harm
innovation and sustainability.<br />
 <br />
THE NETHERLANDS<br />
 <br />
The Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) in the Netherlands, the
country's leading competition authority, released a "<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/www.acm.nl/sites/default/files/old_publication/publicaties/13077_vision-document-competition-and-sustainability-2014-05-09.pdf">Vision Document
Competition and
Sustainability</a>"
in 2014 that challenged the traditional view that lower prices always
equate to consumer welfare. Instead, the ACM proposed a new approach to
competition law evaluation that takes into account factors beyond just
prices. For example, in the Energy Agreement for Sustainable Growth
(<em>Energieakkoord vor duurzame groei</em>), four electricity producers
approached the ACM about their plan to shut down five of their
coal-fired power plants in order to reduce environmental harm. This
cooperative effort was expected to reduce the overall energy supply by
10% and result in higher electricity prices. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/www.acm.nl/sites/default/files/old_publication/publicaties/12082_acm-analysis-of-closing-down-5-coal-power-plants-as-part-of-ser-energieakkoord.pdf">The ACM
found</a> that
this initiative violated <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/http:/www.dutchcivillaw.com/legislation/competitionact.htm">Article 6(1) of the Dutch Competition
Act</a> as
there was no convincing evidence that it would improve consumer welfare,
such as having a significant impact on health and carbon emissions. When
cases such as the above raised concerns about  sustainability, the ACM
developed the Sustainability Guidelines Draft in 2020 which was revised
in 2021. The draft set out by  offering  opportunities to businesses to
meet the sustainability goals. The draft guidelines for sustainability
agreements under <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT:en:PDF">Article 101(1)
TFEU</a> and
its domestic equivalent section 6(1) MW have indicated that such
agreements will not be considered anti-competitive if they don't affect
key competition parameters. The revised conditions under Article 101(3)
TFEU include reference to sustainability benefits and a fair share of
benefits to society. The self-assessment of agreements by the
undertakings or assessment by the ACM is also included.<br />
<br />
The ACM also recently, through its self-assessment of
agreements, <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/www.acm.nl/en/publications/acm-favorable-joint-agreement-between-soft-drink-suppliers-about-discontinuation-plastic-handles">cleared the arrangement of four soft-drink
suppliers</a>,
regarding the removal of plastic handles from all soft-drink and water
multipacks. ACM utilized the preliminary Sustainability Agreement
Guidelines to evaluate this agreement. These guidelines classify five
types of agreements that are permissible and not considered to be
anti-competitive. The present agreement satisfies at least two of these
categories. Through this, we can see that effective implementation of a
sustainable competition policy is considered positive for industry and
business.<br />
 <br />
AUSTRIA<br />
<br />
Austria has taken a bold step compared to the previous soft approaches
by the ACM, as it becomes the first EU Member State to include
sustainable practices through legislation, highlighting its growing
significance. The Austrian law makers have assessed the role of
sustainability in competition law enforcement and considered whether
competition restrictions can be excused for greater sustainability
benefits.<br />
<br />
To this end, the Austrian Parliament  has proposed to extend the
exemption for companies within Article 101(3) TFEU from the cartel ban
in the Cartel and Competition Law Amendment Act 2021 (Kartell und
Wettbewerbsrechts Änderungsgesetz 2021. For the first time in Austrian
antitrust law, <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/watermark.silverchair.com/lpab092.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAAuUwggLhBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggLSMIICzgIBADCCAscGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQM4VpcTOqh7VWNT6OMAgEQgIICmE18TXppP4XABtQB6siwMBw8-YHGlMvaIKeEwbHNCHPYh4vuyWno_0dohR_sYqLSgmW9sNP0_IruHyvXavcOBEgI2ySUEMDZVYPyy6KTUkFfTxpqBxZLAHZUDB7Q56zFcuIp3eqD525oTuiSTQEOnZWXhLGHR7ZnV865dV_bBw12QWXrQvWfxlvTagrWap5QNxr5bIM4n2poXb8QSo5_MJjmwPSZqqVnHh6Ak2uCo9q98LNSpC0IxjfkBGpO-8IzXmEvFJm4vlb_bu_zqBVHTz6tYX-Qrqv4sIS7eJRHrqAx5RM0H7v48zqG24OZYn2m7KHupBQv8MWKqjJrNdfc3IBa7Fpqkl_CcazrEM1IDXoJD3kuEhsyinqehNnMe3oIXfN9DDJzNkjEWBQz5Wci8xT8_sKu0ylcPZVHUv-iFXRutoPMhzdse7UUv0nlWGq586wnMzy0XUYE78YremlGya1vXDtTIB0SLJ3sjix0w9D8FRA9DmO2I59pmqbjXau5Q4XYCqzXFbRjmoLaFx39gBDsBpoK4UXYKL--_TKwRLmT-5F7ExbpKO10SIaUjxwLr6NU852zIsrrZsiKa1xB5GDBDLZR-EZ1Dri8Y9mk5HCptCJKG6ekSPvOpR2BHBTU7zqxIdEiQ5W3F42E6q9TFyyhKnTNAfJNSzB9iE3eRYSQ6ZFM8EPq3CYVc0ggvAv7F0BTEZnzFioZKtesNTnXxXQRaAyFX6ZAY8qSUv8BRjnstS7cCE1DaQU3gtkZ2w3zte4vH9l0pBNxYDbjVQJYr0oj0yuEm-jOOEonoH3GsEs9bxMaqgJNylBYSoofOtbMrzMSGdVu6Etu45ViD8vqN9FxmCz70vuQfmIAtlKhQDMOIxUxR6fGZ18">section 2(1) permits out-of-market efficiencies to have
environmental
benefits</a>,
even if they don't benefit the relevant market directly, as long as
they serve society. The provision specifically mentions that consumers
should would significantly benefit if the improvement in production or
distribution or the promotion of technical or economic progress
significantly contributed to a sustainable or climate-neutral economy.
The focus seems to be mainly on environmental issues rather than the
full range of SDGs. During the consultation process, the Austrian
federal competition authority (BWB), an autonomous authority at the
Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy, stressed the
importance of a broad definition of consumer welfare that takes into
account quality, variety, and innovation, rather than solely focusing on
low prices. However, the BWB also advised that the new concepts and the
definition of environmental and climate benefits should be further
clarified to avoid legal ambiguities. Despite the lack of regulatory
guidance, the legislative materials outline the types of environmental
benefits that may be considered sufficient to exempt from the cartel
prohibition.<br />
 <br />
<br />
INDIA<br />
<br />
As the world's most populous country, India was <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/epi.yale.edu/epi-results/2022/component/epi">ranked at the bottom
of the Environmental Performance Index
(EPI)</a> in</p>
<ol>
  <li>As <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/sustainabledevelopment.un.org/memberstates.html">one of the participating states with the
SDGs</a>,
India is committed to sustainable development. However, no legislative
push has been made vis a vis the integration of sustainability with
competition policy. Even with the release of the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/http:/164.100.47.4/BillsTexts/LSBillTexts/Asintroduced/185_2022_LS_Eng.pdf">Competition Act
Amendment
Bill</a> in
2022, there has no mention of sustainable initiatives or incentives. It
is only recently that discourse on sustainable competition policy has
reached Indian policy making. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319070929/https:/www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/competition-law-fit-to-assess-sustainability-climate-action/article66229745.ece">In a recent
conference</a> in
December 2022, Jyothi Jindgar Bhanot, Secretary of the Competition
Commission of India (CCI), stated that the present competition law
framework has the flexibility to consider sustainable development and
climate change, with "environmental friendliness" being seen as a
factor in competition evaluation. Bhanot states that innovation and
competition are crucial drivers of economic growth and when combined
with sustainable development, they can ensure a safe and secure future.<br />
 <br />
CONCLUSION<br />
​<br />
From a comparative analysis of the India’s competition policy with  the
aforementioned EU countries, India seems to be in the nascent stages of
developing a more sustainable competition policy. In order to do so, an
effective policy that accounts for a country’s unique economic, social
and environmental conditions must be implemented. Various measures, such
as encouraging green and sustainable business practices through
competition, incorporating sustainability considerations in merger
control and also in consumer welfare consideration, along with promotion
of sustainable innovation has the potential to instigate a robust change
in the development of the country.<br />
<br />
Globally, the urgency to address climate change is palpable, and in
light of this, it is crucial that exploration of competition law as a
means of combating climate change is integral for a more environmentally
friendly future.</li>
</ol>]]></content><author><name>Jindal Digest</name></author><category term="blogs" /><category term="editors" /><category term="Tech" /><category term="Personal" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Read our latest legal insights and analysis from expert contributors.]]></summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://pin.it/3PLLj86Sx" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://pin.it/3PLLj86Sx" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">Welcome to JindalDigest!</title><link href="https://jindaldigest.github.io/2024/02/26/welcome-to-jindaldigest/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Welcome to JindalDigest!" /><published>2024-02-26T11:17:11+00:00</published><updated>2024-02-26T11:17:11+00:00</updated><id>https://jindaldigest.github.io/2024/02/26/welcome-to-jindaldigest</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://jindaldigest.github.io/2024/02/26/welcome-to-jindaldigest/"><![CDATA[<iframe src="https://open.spotify.com/embed/playlist/37i9dQZF1E4AnYVmEEo8ws" width="100%" height="232" frameborder="0" allowtransparency="true" allow="encrypted-media"></iframe>
<p>COURSE NAME</p>

<p><strong>REPORT TITLE</strong></p>

<p>LOREM IPSUM DOLOR SIT AMET</p>

<p><img src="" alt="horizontal line" /></p>

<h1><img src="https://unsplash.it/1200/800?image=1061" alt="Placeholder image" /></h1>

<h1 id="introduction">Introduction</h1>

<p>Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetuer adipiscing elit, sed diam nonummy nibh euismod tincidunt ut laoreet dolore magna aliquam erat volutpat. Ut wisi enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exerci tation ullamcorper suscipit lobortis nisl ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis autem vel eum iriure dolor in hendrerit in vulputate velit esse molestie consequat, vel illum dolore eu feugiat nulla facilisis at vero eros et accumsan.</p>

<h2 id="lorem-ipsum">Lorem ipsum</h2>

<p>Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetuer adipiscing elit, sed diam nonummy nibh euismod tincidunt ut laoreet dolore magna aliquam erat volutpat. Ut wisi enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exerci tation ullamcorper suscipit lobortis nisl ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis autem vel eum iriure dolor in hendrerit in vulputate velit esse molestie consequat, vel illum dolore eu feugiat nulla facilisis at vero eros et accumsan. Nam liber tempor cum soluta nobis eleifend option congue nihil imperdiet doming id quod mazim placerat facer possim assum. Typi non habent claritatem insitam; est usus legentis in iis qui facit eorum claritatem. Investigationes demonstraverunt lectores legere me lius quod ii legunt saepius.</p>

<p>Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetuer adipiscing elit, sed diam nonummy nibh euismod tincidunt ut laoreet dolore magna aliquam erat volutpat. Ut wisi enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exerci tation ullamcorper suscipit lobortis nisl ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat.</p>

<h3 id="dolor-sit-amet">Dolor sit amet</h3>

<p>Nam liber tempor cum soluta nobis eleifend option congue nihil imperdiet doming id quod mazim placerat facer possim assum. Typi non habent claritatem insitam; est usus legentis in iis qui facit eorum claritatem. Investigationes demonstraverunt lectores legere me lius quod ii legunt saepius. Duis autem vel eum iriure dolor in hendrerit in vulputate velit esse molestie consequat, vel illum dolore eu feugiat nulla facilisis at vero eros et accumsan.</p>]]></content><author><name>Jindal Digest</name></author><category term="blogs" /><category term="editors" /><category term="Tech" /><category term="Personal" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Read our latest legal insights and analysis from expert contributors.]]></summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://unsplash.it/1200/800?image=1061" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://unsplash.it/1200/800?image=1061" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">The Need For A Sustainable Competition Policy</title><link href="https://jindaldigest.github.io/2023/02/21/The-Legal-Saga-of-Breaking-End-to-End-Encryption-in-India-Constitutional-or-Unconstitutional/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="The Need For A Sustainable Competition Policy" /><published>2023-02-21T11:17:11+00:00</published><updated>2023-02-21T11:17:11+00:00</updated><id>https://jindaldigest.github.io/2023/02/21/The-Legal-Saga-of-Breaking-End-to-End%20Encryption-in-India%E2%80%93Constitutional-or-Unconstitutional</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://jindaldigest.github.io/2023/02/21/The-Legal-Saga-of-Breaking-End-to-End-Encryption-in-India-Constitutional-or-Unconstitutional/"><![CDATA[<p>﻿<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/jindaldigest.weebly.com/blog-781581/the-legal-saga-of-breaking-end-to-end-encryption-in-india-constitutional-or-unconstitutional"><strong>The Legal Saga of Breaking End-to-End Encryption in India – Constitutional or Unconstitutional?</strong></a></p>

<p><strong>By Vivek Basanagoudar &amp; Kabir Singh</strong></p>

<p><strong>I. Introduction: Decoding Encryption and its Significance
​</strong>
Encryption, or its lesser-known name, the ancient art of cryptography, <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Information%20Technology%20%28Certifying%20Authority%29.pdf">is the conversion of</a><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Information%20Technology%20%28Certifying%20Authority%29.pdf"> plaintext data into an unintelligible form</a>, in a manner that the original data, without the application of an inverse decryption process, is impossible to recover.  With the 1990’s internet boom came the need of securing online communications and transactions, which had multiplied by millions. Encryption is precisely what fulfilled this need, and is now omnipresent in every aspect of our life, from the mobile phones in our pockets to the banks where our money is deposited. It plays a significant role in our day-to-day life and <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/oaklandsok.github.io/papers/unger2014.pdf">carries out numerous important functions</a> such as ensuring sender and recipient anonymity, participation anonymity, authenticity of messages, etc. Hence, the existence of encryption is indispensable for the existence of maintaining citizens’ right to privacy in the online world.</p>

<p>However, despite its obvious benefits, some consider encryption a “double-edged sword”, due to its <em>supposed</em> interference with the intelligence capabilities of law enforcement agencies (“LEAs”). Due to the same, there have been <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/rajyasabha.nic.in/rsnew/Committee_site/Committee_File/ReportFile/71/140/0_2020_2_16.pdf">numerous calls for the abandonment</a> of End-to-End Encryption (“E2EE”), the most commonly applied secure encryption technology by commercial messaging platforms, such as WhatsApp, Telegram etc. It is in continuation of this saga against encryption, that the Government of India passed <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Intermediary_Guidelines_and_Digital_Media_Ethics_Code_Rules-2021.pdf">the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 Rules</a> (“IT Rules”) and proposed <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/Draft%20Indian%20Telecommunication%20Bill%2C%202022.pdf">the Draft Indian Telecommunication Bill, 2022</a> (“Draft Telecom Bill”), both of which mandate the breakdown of E2EE.
​
Hence, the objective of this article is to argue against the breakdown of E2EE by the above-mentioned legislations, and prove that the same is violative of the fundamental right to privacy under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, and thus unconstitutional.</p>

<p><strong>II. Understanding the Indian Encryption Legal Landscape –</strong> </p>

<p>A.  The Legal Status of Encryption
The fundamental right to privacy has been recognised to be a part of Article 21 of the Constitution i.e., the fundamental right to life by the Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2012/35071/35071_2012_Judgement_24-Aug-2017.pdf"><em>K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India</em></a> (<em>Puttaswamy I</em>). The judgment also noted that there exist <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2012/35071/35071_2012_Judgement_24-Aug-2017.pdf">various types of privacies</a>, including the right to communicational privacy, which is an individual’s right to control who has access to their communications; and informational privacy, which is an individual’s right of preventing their information from being disseminated and controlling the extent of access over it. In continuation of the same, the Supreme Court recently held in <em>Subhash Chandra Agrawal</em> that the right to privacy <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/www.sci.gov.in/pdf/JUD_3.pdf">includes the right to protect one’s identity and anonymity</a>.</p>

<p>Moreover, <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/http:/nujslawreview.org/2019/01/01/conceptualising-interaction-between-cryptography-and-law/">various scholars have also argued</a> that a right to encryption may be founded on the basis of the rights to communicational and informational privacy, given their interlinked relationship with encryption i.e., the former’s existence is dependent on the latter’s application in the modern digital world. Hence, while not explicitly held, it may be argued that there exists a general right to encryption.</p>

<p>B.  Breakdown of E2EE by New Legislations
As mentioned earlier, the Government of India has proposed legislations which mandate the breakdown of E2EE i.e., the implementation of these legislations would mandatorily require the removal of E2EE across intermediaries. The precise provisions which allow doing so are <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Intermediary_Guidelines_and_Digital_Media_Ethics_Code_Rules-2021.pdf">Rule 4(2) of the IT Rules</a> and <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/Draft%20Indian%20Telecommunication%20Bill%2C%202022.pdf">Section 24(2)(a) of the Draft Telecom Bill</a> since they mandate tracing the “first-originator” of any message, and grant intercepting powers of any message, respectively. One might find the Draft Telecom Bill’s inclusion in the above strange, but since the proposed Bill’s scope has been <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/scroll.in/latest/1033418/centres-draft-bill-proposes-to-regulate-ott-platforms-by-bringing-them-under-telecom-services">enlarged to regulate OTT Platforms</a>, commercial messaging apps such as WhatsApp, and Telegram also come under its purview.</p>

<p>Application of the aforementioned legislations would require all the services that are governed by said legislatures to build the ability to identify the first originator of <strong>every</strong> message/communication since it is impossible to predict which message would require tracing. Moreover, the application of said legislations is <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/scontent.fbho3-2.fna.fbcdn.net/v/t39.8562-6/309473131_1302549333851760_6207638168445881915_n.pdf?_nc_cat=107&amp;ccb=1-7&amp;_nc_sid=ad8a9d&amp;_nc_ohc=EuobTz5NM24AX8w3ymQ&amp;_nc_ht=scontent.fbho3-2.fna&amp;oh=00_AfBuJI-jqScGz5qKCEP0-cf4o770cu_gKH7uYNUh_Esqzg&amp;oe=63CAFB5D">technologically impossible to implement</a> with E2EE, since said technology ensures that the contents of the message are only privy to the sender and receiver of the message. Disabling the same for even intercepting a single message would inevitably lead to its disabling for the entire platform, thus endangering the privacy of each user. The same has been affirmed by <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3243734.3243747">numerous scientific organisations</a> and <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/28552576">research groups</a>. Thus, the implementation of the challenged legislations would result in endangering the right to privacy of every Indian citizen who uses these platforms. This is precisely why <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/theprint.in/india/whatsapp-challenges-new-it-rules-in-delhi-hc-terms-it-unconstitutional/666023/">WhatsApp has challenged Rule 4(2) of the IT Rules</a> in the Delhi High Court (<em>WhatsApp LLC Vs. Union of India</em>), and why <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/Draft%20Indian%20Telecommunication%20Bill%2C%202022.pdf">Section 24(2)(a) of the Draft Telecom Bill</a> should not be introduced in the Parliament.</p>

<p>The Supreme Court in <em>Puttaswamy I</em> held that any <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2012/35071/35071_2012_Judgement_24-Aug-2017.pdf">violation of the right to privacy must pass the three-pronged test</a> of – i) Legality (Valid law); ii) Legitimate State Aim (Necessity); and iii) Proportionality. The next part argues that the legislations do not pass the <em>Puttaswamy I</em> test, and are hence unconstitutional.</p>

<p><strong>III. Determining the Constitutionality of Breakdown of E2EE –</strong>  
A.  Valid Law
The Apex Court in <em>Puttaswamy I</em> held that any invasion of the right to privacy must be backed by a valid law i.e., <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2012/35071/35071_2012_Judgement_24-Aug-2017.pdf">passed by the Parliament of India</a>. The <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/eprocure.gov.in/cppp/rulesandprocs/kbadqkdlcswfjdelrquehwuxcfmijmuixngudufgbuubgubfugbububjxcgfvsbdihbgfGhdfgFHytyhRtMTk4NzY=">IT (Amendment) Act of 2008</a>, added Section 84A, according to which the Government holds to power to <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_45_76_00001_200021_1517807324077&amp;sectionId=13122&amp;sectionno=84A&amp;orderno=113">prescribe the modes and methods of encryption in India</a>. Alongside the same, Section 69 grants the Central Government the Power <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_45_76_00001_200021_1517807324077&amp;sectionId=13097&amp;sectionno=69&amp;orderno=88">to issue directions for interception or monitoring or decryption</a> of any information through any computer resource, and Section 87(2)(y) further <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_45_76_00001_200021_1517807324077&amp;sectionId=13127&amp;sectionno=87&amp;orderno=118">allows them to make rules</a> in furtherance of the same. The IT Rules, which mandate tracing the first-originator are a form of secondary legislation, passed by the Executive under the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/eprocure.gov.in/cppp/rulesandprocs/kbadqkdlcswfjdelrquehwuxcfmijmuixngudufgbuubgubfugbububjxcgfvsbdihbgfGhdfgFHytyhRtMjk4NzY=#:~:text=%5B9th%20June%2C%202000%5D%20An,communication%20and%20storage%20of%20information%2C">Information Technology Act, 2000</a> (IT Act), and not the legislature. Therefore, the point of consideration is whether the IT Rules being a secondary legislative statute could be characterised as ‘valid law’.</p>

<p>The Supreme Court in a multitude of cases, such as <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/main.sci.gov.in/judgment/judis/39355.pdf"><em>Union of India v. S. Srinivasan</em></a>, <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2006/18956/18956_2006_Judgement_28-Sep-2018.pdf"><em>Indian Young Lawyers Assn. v. State of Kerala</em></a>, has held that if a secondary legislation goes beyond the scope of its parent act, it may be struck down. However, by the virtue of Sections 69, 84A, and 87(2)(y), the IT Rules do not go beyond the scope of their parent act, and <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2021/04/10/intermediary-guidelines-and-the-digital-public-sphere-tracing-first-originators/">hence may be regarded as valid law</a>. The authors refrain from delving into the Draft Telecom Bill for this prong of the test since the Bill is still in its draft version and has yet to be passed.</p>

<p>Thus, the legislation in question meets the valid law prong. At the same time, it is key to note that the three-prong test must be passed in <strong>totality</strong> i.e., even if a single prong is not met, the legislation is unconstitutional.</p>

<p>B.  Legitimate State Aim
This prong is also known as the test of necessity, since it involves delving into whether the legislation in question possesses a legitimate state aim. The authors argue that the legislations in question do not possess a legitimate state aim, since breaking down of E2EE is not a legitimate state aim. The Government’s primary argument is that E2EE <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1129050/2020.10.11_International_statement_end-to-end_encryption_and_public_safety_for_publication_final.pdf">acts as a great deterrent against LEA’s investigation capabilities</a>, and grants protection to criminals. However, this is untrue because breaking down the E2E encryption is not the only way the LEA’s can investigate. There are equally effective investigative alternatives. With the advent of technology and the interconnected network web created by it, technology can be accordingly leveraged to the advantage of the LEAs.</p>

<p>Just in India, there exists <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/indias-growing-data-usage-smartphone-adoption-to-boost-digital-india-initiatives-top-bureaucrat/articleshow/87275402.cms">more than 1.18 billion mobile connections</a>, 700 million internet users, and 600 million mobile phones, which is rising by 25 million every quarter, and each of the mentioned leaves a digital trail. These <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/public-sector/law-enforcement-investigative-analytics.html">digital trails could be used by the LEAs</a> via data analytic techniques, and combat crime and terrorism, thus making their claim of being interrupted by E2EE invalid. Moreover, breaking E2EE would mostly affect citizens <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/ctc.usma.edu/how-terrorists-use-encryption/">since terrorists usually use far more sophisticated technology</a>. Additionally, scientific research has proved that the Government possesses  <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Kerr-Encryption-Workarounds.pdf">well-established</a> “workarounds”  encryption, which can be deployed <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/www.salon.com/2017/03/22/bypassing-encryption-lawful-hacking-is-the-next-frontier-of-law-enforcement-technology_partner/">without sacrificing the right to privacy of every Indian user</a>, by breaking E2EE. The same is further supplemented by real-life incidents, such as the infamous case of <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/us/san-bernardino-shooting.html">US San Bernardino Shooting</a>. In the said case, the FBI fought a legal battle against Apple, for the sake of creating a backdoor in the iPhone used by the attackers. <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-wants-apple-to-help-unlock-iphone-used-by-san-bernardino-shooter/2016/02/16/69b903ee-d4d9-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html?itid=lk_inline_manual_8">Apple greatly resisted the same</a>, and despite their refusal to grant access, the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/28/472192080/the-fbi-has-successfully-unlocked-the-iphone-without-apples-help">FBI still managed to access the iPhone</a>, with the use of a third-party which deployed work-arounds the iPhone’s encryption system.</p>

<p>Hence, since there exists no necessity of breaking E2EE, the challenged legislations do not possess a legitimate state aim and fail this prong of the test.</p>

<p>C.  Proportionality
The last prong of the <em>Puttaswamy I</em> test is the proportionality standard, which ensures that the nature and quality of the encroachment on the right to privacy <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2012/35071/35071_2012_Judgement_24-Aug-2017.pdf">are not disproportionate to the purpose of the law</a>. The Supreme Court has held a similar stance in the cases such as <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2016/6097/6097_2016_9_1501_17294_Judgement_04-Oct-2019.pdf"><em>Kerala State Beverages (M&amp;M) Corp. Ltd. v. P.P. Suresh</em></a>, <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/main.sci.gov.in/judgment/judis/20380.pdf"><em>Om Kumar and Ors. vs Union of India</em></a>, which have clarified that infringement of fundamental rights must be done via the “least restrictive alternative”.</p>

<p>In the present scenario, the legislations in question lead to the violation of the right to privacy of each of the million Indian users who use the affected platforms since, even keeping the technological aspect aside, there is no way to predict which message would be targeted for interception. This consequently contrasts with various Supreme Court judgments such as <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/main.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/4404.pdf"><em>Gobind v. State of M.P](https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/main.sci.gov.in/judgment/judis/6014.pdf)</em>.<em>, and [</em>Malak Singh v. State of P&amp;H*</a>, which have held that surveillance must only be restricted to those who show the possibility of committing crimes. The present legislations affect every Indian user, thus blatantly ignoring the requirement of restrictive surveillance.</p>

<p>Additionally, it must be noted that breaking E2EE would <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/www.ijlt.in/journal/encryption-in-india%3A-preserving-the-online-engine-of-privacy%2C-free-expression%2C-security%2C-and-economic-growth">have adverse effects of unimaginable proportions</a>, since it would infringe on human rights and the privacy of many groups such as journalists, attorney/doctor client privileges, financially sensitive information and more. Encryption is <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/www.ijlt.in/journal/encryption-in-india%3A-preserving-the-online-engine-of-privacy%2C-free-expression%2C-security%2C-and-economic-growth"><em>sine quo non</em> for cyber security</a>, and more importantly, national security. Lastly, as argued earlier, the Government possesses numerous workarounds in encryption, meaning breaking E2EE is <strong>not</strong> the “<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/indiankanoon.org/doc/2665405/">least restrictive alternative</a>”. Thus, the challenged legislations do not meet the proportionality standard.</p>

<p>Hence, to summarise, while the legislations meet the valid law prong, they do not meet the prongs of legitimate state aim and proportionality, and thus do not pass the test laid in <em>Puttaswamy I</em>. To conclude, the legislations are violative of Article 21 and unconstitutional.</p>

<p><strong>IV. The Way Forward</strong>
The Supreme Court of India in the landmark case of <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/main.sci.gov.in/judgment/judis/38154.pdf"><em>Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India</em></a> famously remarked that sacrificing fundamental rights “on the anvil of fervid desire to find instantaneous solutions to systemic problems” would lead to dangerous circumstances. These concerns have unfortunately come to prophetically materialise into reality in the present scenario.
​
In pursuit of finding an instantaneous solution to the problems faced by E2EE, which could have easily been circumvented, the Government has attempted to completely ban its implementation, haemorrhaging the fundamental right to privacy of millions of Indian citizens. Thus, the authors sincerely hope that Courts strike down <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Intermediary_Guidelines_and_Digital_Media_Ethics_Code_Rules-2021.pdf">Rule 4(2) of the IT Rules</a>, and that the Government withdraws <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230319090840/https:/dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/Draft%20Indian%20Telecommunication%20Bill%2C%202022.pdf">Section 24(2)(a) from the Draft Telecom Bill</a>, for the noble purpose of protecting the fundamental right to privacy of the citizens of India.</p>]]></content><author><name>Jindal Digest</name></author><category term="blogs" /><category term="editors" /><category term="Tech" /><category term="Personal" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Read our latest legal insights and analysis from expert contributors.]]></summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://pin.it/3PLLj86Sx" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://pin.it/3PLLj86Sx" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">Deal Value Threshold and its’ impact on India</title><link href="https://jindaldigest.github.io/2023/02/21/DEAL-VALUE-THRESHOLD-AND-ITS-IMPACT-ON-INDIA/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Deal Value Threshold and its’ impact on India" /><published>2023-02-21T10:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2023-02-21T10:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://jindaldigest.github.io/2023/02/21/DEAL-VALUE-THRESHOLD-AND-ITS-IMPACT-ON-INDIA</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://jindaldigest.github.io/2023/02/21/DEAL-VALUE-THRESHOLD-AND-ITS-IMPACT-ON-INDIA/"><![CDATA[<p><strong>By Vedanti Singhal</strong></p>

<p><img src="Aspose.Words.0ccbebc9-b999-4bb0-8896-91a8dac8ebd4.001.jpeg" alt="Picture" /></p>

<p><strong>Abstract:</strong> Over the last decade, the global economy has witnessed some high-value mergers. However, owing the traditional turnover-asset based regulatory framework, such combinations did not call for pre-merger approval giving way to concentration of market power with a few dominant players and threw light on harm theories. This paper attempts to elucidate the idea of deal value or transaction value threshold as an addition to the present regime as an effort to reassess and make the present merger regime in India more dynamic. A segment of the paper also proposes a reliable implementation of DVT alongside a post-review provision so to leave no scope of misuse or error.</p>

<p><code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge"> </code><strong>Traditional Merger Control Regime in India</strong></p>

<p>Mergers, acquisitions, and amalgamations, referred as combinations, are governed by the Competition Act, 2002 (“the Act”) and its corresponding regulations in India. Section 5 of the Act prescribes the notifiability criteria for combinations. The notification thresholds are essentially based on the cumulative asset and turnover of the involved parties. The competition authority, Competition Commission of India (“CCI”), is vested with the role of reviewing the notified combinations to examine whether the proposed transaction could cause an appreciable adverse effect of competition (“AAEC”) and to prevent or modify such a combination before consummation. A corollary of such merger review is that merger notification thresholds should sieve those transactions that are unlikely to cause AAEC. For this reason, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (“MCA”) has granted an exemption to certain transactions below a specified threshold from the CCI’s gaze. This exemption is noted as de minimis exemption or small target exemption. It lays down an either/or criteria, per which transactions are exempt from notifying the CCI if the target or acquiree has assets in India not exceeding INR 350 crore, or turnover in India not exceeding INR 1000 crore.</p>

<p>The idea was introduced in 2011 with the purpose of reducing regulatory burden on the CCI. In March 2022, the MCA extended this exemption for another five years to enhance India’s. “ease of doing business” in the post-COVID-19 world. India has witnessed a spurt in mergers and acquisitions (“M&amp;A”) in the recent years with a 40% hike in M&amp;A deal value and 60% increase in deal volumes in 2021. However, with the upshot of digitization, certain high-profile deals have evaded the CCI’s review because of this exemption and have raised. anti-trust concerns as the present merger control regime fails to regulate digital mergers, that do not breach the asset or turnover threshold.</p>

<p><strong>Digitization and an Apparent Enforcement Gap</strong></p>

<p>The effectiveness of merger control thresholds in the digital market is contentious. Business models in digital platforms aim at expanding their consumer base by extending low-cost, oreven free, services. Digital markets prioritize amassing a critical user-base as their objective is to collect, consolidate and process as much data as possible which is valuable in expanding their commercial footprint. Big data refers to large, diverse sets of information that is constantly growing and its notable source is consumer’s online activities. By consolidating data, companies can increase their product/service’s efficiency thereby, achieving economies of scale and meeting consumer requirements. Since digital markets prioritize creating a user-base, they burn cash in initial years and don’t generate substantial revenue till they reach a critical mass. Due to their minimal turnover in the budding phase, targets involved in acquisitions in the digital market slip under the requisite merger threshold. However, the incumbent acquirer recognizes the potential and threat posed by these nascent target firms. These firms are valued significantly owing to their degree of innovation, technical know-how and access to data and the same is evident in their acquisition price. The aggregation of data by a few businesses creates entry barriers in the digital space and result in AAEC concerns which might go unaccounted due to the existing threshold regime.</p>

<p>These kind of acquisitions pave way for two probable theories of harm, killer acquisitions and nascent potential competitors. Killer acquisition is the practice of established firms acquiring nascent competitors to ward off future competition with the sole intention of terminating target’s product/service. Whereas as per nascent potential competitors theory of harm, the acquirer eliminates potential competition by buying the target firm and continuing its product. Digital companies, globally, have resorted to these practices in the past decade. Between 2008-2018, Google acquired 168 companies, Facebook 71 companies, and Amazon 60 companies.
​</p>

<p><img src="Aspose.Words.0ccbebc9-b999-4bb0-8896-91a8dac8ebd4.002.png" alt="Picture" /></p>

<p>​Some incidents of prominent killer acquisitions in India include  Zomato’s USD 350 million acquisition of Uber Eats in January 2020; Ola Cabs’ USD 200 million acquisition of TaxiForSure in the taxi aggregator space in March 2015; and Flipkart’s USD 70 million acquisition of the Indian fashion e-commerce portal, Jabong.com through its subsidiary, Myntra, in 2016.</p>

<p>On similar lines, a more recent merger of PVR and Inox Leisure in March 2022, triggered the de-minimis exemption and allowed automatic approval imminently after the government announced its exemption. This deal will lead to the creation of single dominant player in the multiplex chain with approximately 50% market share, without attracting antitrust review. As a general practice, a merger of this nature would’ve required CCI’s approval but the post- merger turnover of PVR-Inox is under INR 1000 Crores (small target exemption requirement). Despite an apprehension of potential AAEC or the evident anti-competitive nature of the merger, it does not attract an inquiry under Section 3 and 4 of the Act as was ruled in Consumer Unity &amp; Trust Society v. PVR Ltd.
​</p>

<p><img src="Aspose.Words.0ccbebc9-b999-4bb0-8896-91a8dac8ebd4.003.jpeg" alt="Picture" /></p>

<p>These combinations underscore the need to consider abuse of competitive powers that come with the appetite to maintain a data advantage. Existing merger regime may be inefficient as revenue/asset cannot be the exclusive metric, but the competition authority has to choose a middle ground to combat anti-competitive activities without hampering innovation.</p>

<p><strong>Deal Value Threshold: A Panacea?</strong></p>

<p>Deal Value Threshold (“DVT”) or transaction value threshold digresses from the tradition asset-turnover criteria by considering the economic value of a transaction and the domestic presence of the target company. One of the major jurisdictions, United States, has adopted the transaction size test for merger reviews where transactions valued above a threshold value are to be notified to the regulatory agency, the Federal Trade Commission. The test has been relatively more successful than revenue-asset criteria in bringing transactions in the digital space within the purview of merger review. Some other jurisdictions that have considered DVT as a replacement or as a complementary threshold to the traditional merger regime include Canada, Germany, Austria, Sweden and South Korea. For instance, the German DVT model prescribes that if a transaction exceeds EUR 400 million, has substantial operations in Germany, it has to be notified to the competition authority. A <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230105081635/https:/www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Leitfaden/Leitfaden_Transaktionsschwelle.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&amp;v=2https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Leitfaden/Leitfaden_Transaktionsschwelle.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&amp;v=2">guidance note</a> released by the Austrian and German competition regulators expounds on the meaning of ‘value of consideration’ to mean accumulation of ‘all assets and other monetary benefits’ that the acquirer may receive from a target in a transaction.</p>

<p><strong>Competition Amendment Bill 2020: Identifying Indian Merger Regime’s Blind Spot</strong></p>

<p>The Competition Law Review Committee (“CLRC”) in its <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230105081635/https:/www.ies.gov.in/pdfs/Report-Competition-CLRC.pdf">2019 report</a> recommended the introduction of DVT along side the present merger control regime. This was followed with the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230105081635/https:/www.taxmanagementindia.com/file_folder/folder_5/Draft_Competition_Amendment_Bill_2020.pdf">Draft Competition (Amendment) Bill, 2020 (“the Bill”)</a>. The Bill introduced an enabling proviso under Section 5 of the Act, which provides that the Central Government may, in consultation with CCI, lay down new sector-specific thresholds, other than the ones already present, for notifying purposes. The prescription of new criteria is to be made in ‘public interest.’</p>

<p><strong>Potential Challenges</strong></p>

<p>At face value, this amendment may appear fructuous and in accordance with effective foreign merger regimes, but it is not devoid of loopholes. For starters, the Amendment does not define ‘public interest’ or provide clarity on what factors must the Government consider while prescribing new thresholds. This inconsistency creates ambiguity and accords the Central Government substantial power under the garb of ‘public interest.’ It could also lead to potential power imbalance as the authority of the CCI will get diluted while simultaneously handing over the reigns to the Central Government. However, India can take inspiration from the South African regime which is known to be effectively based on public interest considerations. In June 2021, the South African Commission stayed the proposed acquisition of Burger King South Africa by a private equity fund, ECP Africa, as the merger would’ve had a significant impact on the shareholding of the historically disadvantaged people in the target firm. </p>

<p>Second, DVT as a concept is subjective and prone to variation as the valuation of a target firm may vary across acquirers. It is also difficult to measure the competitive significance of a transaction. A start-up may be acquired at a low value, but the subsequent effect of the merger may cause AAEC and disrupt the market and the same cannot be gauged at the outset.  A delineation of this proposition is the Facebook-WhatsApp deal where Facebook completed its acquisition for USD 22 billion as opposed to the initial offer of USD 19 billion due to rise in Facebook’s share value. This example highlights how the actual value of transaction is contingent upon multiple factors and is susceptible to fluctuations. The CLRC report has acknowledged and cautioned policymakers of such fluctuations.</p>

<p>Third, direct appropriation of DVT may not be context sensitive owing to Indian digital market’s infancy. Cash-strapped start-ups often need investment from incumbent players in the market and introduction of DVT may be counter-intuitive by exposing them to prolonged procedures and resultantly, disincentivize them. CCI observed in the Flipkart case that intervention in digital market should be done carefully lest it may stifle innovation.</p>

<p><strong>Is DVT Salvageable?</strong></p>

<p>The challenges discussed above don’t negate the possibility of DVT’s implementation in India, it just stresses on the need to make it context specific. The uncertainty attached with nascent acquisitions can be dealt with the measures discussed below.</p>

<p>For DVT to be effective, there needs to be an explicit and unambiguous definition of ‘value of transaction.’ This is also in line with the International Competition Network’s (“ICN”) requirement of having clear and understandable merger thresholds which are based on quantifiable criteria. Without procedural clarity, the competition authority would get loaded with false-positive cases. Even the CLRC recognizes the ICN recommendation, it fails to suggest measures on its actual execution. The CLRC Report suggests that DVT must apply to those entities that have ‘substantial business operations’ in the country. However, the phrase has not been defined and is unclear on whether it would cover the digital market. The concept of network effects is specific to digital markets and helps in determining potential market power. Network effect can be plainly understood as a phenomenon where the use of a product or service increases the value of the product/service for other users. Network effect works in a manner that once a digital firm becomes dominant, owing to which it attracts most users, it neutralizes competition in the market. Since, the nature of network effect is fundamentally anti-competitive, the proposed amendment must clarify whether the same would be accounted in determining the ‘value of transaction’ and ‘substantial business operations’</p>

<p>Like some foreign competition authorities, CCI could be vested with enhanced powers to review transactions post-merger. It is pertinent to acknowledge the uncertainties attached with nascent acquisitions and predict the impact on the market. Ex-post assessment allows the competition authority to intervene and break-up consummated mergers which may have appeared benign initially but turned out to be anti-competitive post consummation. Ex-post assessment essentially vests the regulatory body with the power to review an acquisition post-completion. As an ex-post review is conducted post-merger, it gives the regulatory body a buffer period to assess the actual effects of a merger. Some notable jurisdictions that have implemented this provision include US, Japan, UK, Brazil, Canada. In a recent <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230105081635/https:/one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP\(2020\)5/en/pdf">OECD Secretarial Note</a>, ex-post review to assess a merger’s impact on market was recommended to counter killer acquisitions. This provision prevents the competition authority from being handicapped by quaint or inefficient merger provisions. Therefore, ex-post review is needed in the Indian regime to enable the CCI to revoke its grant to a merger which may cause AAEC but previously, side-stepped its scrutiny. As a natural corollary, an effective ex-post assessment provision calls for a flexible time period to judge the impact of mergers along with a thorough framework which lays down guidelines for circumstances demanding ex-post review.</p>

<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>

<p>India’s merger regime has a blind spot which does not cater to the constraints of digital economies like limited turnover and asset value, network effects and hence, is not equipped to deal with combinations in the digital market. Implementation of sector-specific threshold, with definitive guidelines, may prove to be effective if coupled with facilitating provisions like post-merger review. India has previously borrowed and adapted foreign legislations to suit its requirements and relying on this trend could help foster effective anti-trust laws.</p>

<p><strong>Relevant keywords:</strong> Deal Value Threshold (DVT), Competition Commission of India (CCI), Mergers, Digital, Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC)</p>]]></content><author><name>Jindal Digest</name></author><category term="blogs" /><category term="contributors" /><category term="Tech" /><category term="Personal" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Read our latest legal insights and analysis from expert contributors.]]></summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://unsplash.it/1200/800?image=1059" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://unsplash.it/1200/800?image=1059" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">The Legal Saga of Breaking End-to-End Encryption in India – Constitutional or Unconstitutional?</title><link href="https://jindaldigest.github.io/2023/02/21/The-Legal-Saga-of-Breaking-End-to-End-Encryption-in-India-Constitutional-or-Unconstitutional/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="The Legal Saga of Breaking End-to-End Encryption in India – Constitutional or Unconstitutional?" /><published>2023-02-21T10:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2023-02-21T10:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://jindaldigest.github.io/2023/02/21/The-Legal-Saga-of-Breaking-End-to-End-Encryption-in-India-Constitutional-or-Unconstitutional</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://jindaldigest.github.io/2023/02/21/The-Legal-Saga-of-Breaking-End-to-End-Encryption-in-India-Constitutional-or-Unconstitutional/"><![CDATA[<h1 id="i-introduction-decoding-encryption-and-its-significance">I. Introduction: Decoding Encryption and its Significance</h1>
<p>Encryption, or its lesser-known name, the ancient art of cryptography, is the conversion of plaintext data into an unintelligible form, in a manner that the original data, without the application of an inverse decryption process, is impossible to recover.  With the 1990’s internet boom came the need of securing online communications and transactions, which had multiplied by millions. Encryption is precisely what fulfilled this need, and is now omnipresent in every aspect of our life, from the mobile phones in our pockets to the banks where our money is deposited. It plays a significant role in our day-to-day life and carries out numerous important functions such as ensuring sender and recipient anonymity, participation anonymity, authenticity of messages, etc. Hence, the existence of encryption is indispensable for the existence of maintaining citizens’ right to privacy in the online world.</p>

<p>However, despite its obvious benefits, some consider encryption a “double-edged sword”, due to its supposed interference with the intelligence capabilities of law enforcement agencies (“LEAs”). Due to the same, there have been numerous calls for the abandonment of End-to-End Encryption (“E2EE”), the most commonly applied secure encryption technology by commercial messaging platforms, such as WhatsApp, Telegram etc. It is in continuation of this saga against encryption, that the Government of India passed the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 Rules (“IT Rules”) and proposed the Draft Indian Telecommunication Bill, 2022 (“Draft Telecom Bill”), both of which mandate the breakdown of E2EE.
​
Hence, the objective of this article is to argue against the breakdown of E2EE by the above-mentioned legislations, and prove that the same is violative of the fundamental right to privacy under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, and thus unconstitutional.</p>

<p>II. Understanding the Indian Encryption Legal Landscape –</p>

<p>A.  The Legal Status of Encryption
The fundamental right to privacy has been recognised to be a part of Article 21 of the Constitution i.e., the fundamental right to life by the Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (Puttaswamy I). The judgment also noted that there exist various types of privacies, including the right to communicational privacy, which is an individual’s right to control who has access to their communications; and informational privacy, which is an individual’s right of preventing their information from being disseminated and controlling the extent of access over it. In continuation of the same, the Supreme Court recently held in Subhash Chandra Agrawal that the right to privacy includes the right to protect one’s identity and anonymity.</p>

<p>Moreover, various scholars have also argued that a right to encryption may be founded on the basis of the rights to communicational and informational privacy, given their interlinked relationship with encryption i.e., the former’s existence is dependent on the latter’s application in the modern digital world. Hence, while not explicitly held, it may be argued that there exists a general right to encryption.</p>

<p>B.  Breakdown of E2EE by New Legislations
As mentioned earlier, the Government of India has proposed legislations which mandate the breakdown of E2EE i.e., the implementation of these legislations would mandatorily require the removal of E2EE across intermediaries. The precise provisions which allow doing so are Rule 4(2) of the IT Rules and Section 24(2)(a) of the Draft Telecom Bill since they mandate tracing the “first-originator” of any message, and grant intercepting powers of any message, respectively. One might find the Draft Telecom Bill’s inclusion in the above strange, but since the proposed Bill’s scope has been enlarged to regulate OTT Platforms, commercial messaging apps such as WhatsApp, and Telegram also come under its purview.</p>

<p>Application of the aforementioned legislations would require all the services that are governed by said legislatures to build the ability to identify the first originator of every message/communication since it is impossible to predict which message would require tracing. Moreover, the application of said legislations is technologically impossible to implement with E2EE, since said technology ensures that the contents of the message are only privy to the sender and receiver of the message. Disabling the same for even intercepting a single message would inevitably lead to its disabling for the entire platform, thus endangering the privacy of each user. The same has been affirmed by numerous scientific organisations and research groups. Thus, the implementation of the challenged legislations would result in endangering the right to privacy of every Indian citizen who uses these platforms. This is precisely why WhatsApp has challenged Rule 4(2) of the IT Rules in the Delhi High Court (WhatsApp LLC Vs. Union of India), and why Section 24(2)(a) of the Draft Telecom Bill should not be introduced in the Parliament.</p>

<p>The Supreme Court in Puttaswamy I held that any violation of the right to privacy must pass the three-pronged test of – i) Legality (Valid law); ii) Legitimate State Aim (Necessity); and iii) Proportionality. The next part argues that the legislations do not pass the Puttaswamy I test, and are hence unconstitutional.</p>

<p>III. Determining the Constitutionality of Breakdown of E2EE –<br />
A.  Valid Law
The Apex Court in Puttaswamy I held that any invasion of the right to privacy must be backed by a valid law i.e., passed by the Parliament of India. The IT (Amendment) Act of 2008, added Section 84A, according to which the Government holds to power to prescribe the modes and methods of encryption in India. Alongside the same, Section 69 grants the Central Government the Power to issue directions for interception or monitoring or decryption of any information through any computer resource, and Section 87(2)(y) further allows them to make rules in furtherance of the same. The IT Rules, which mandate tracing the first-originator are a form of secondary legislation, passed by the Executive under the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act), and not the legislature. Therefore, the point of consideration is whether the IT Rules being a secondary legislative statute could be characterised as ‘valid law’.</p>

<p>The Supreme Court in a multitude of cases, such as Union of India v. S. Srinivasan, Indian Young Lawyers Assn. v. State of Kerala, has held that if a secondary legislation goes beyond the scope of its parent act, it may be struck down. However, by the virtue of Sections 69, 84A, and 87(2)(y), the IT Rules do not go beyond the scope of their parent act, and hence may be regarded as valid law. The authors refrain from delving into the Draft Telecom Bill for this prong of the test since the Bill is still in its draft version and has yet to be passed.</p>

<p>Thus, the legislation in question meets the valid law prong. At the same time, it is key to note that the three-prong test must be passed in totality i.e., even if a single prong is not met, the legislation is unconstitutional.</p>

<p>B.  Legitimate State Aim
This prong is also known as the test of necessity, since it involves delving into whether the legislation in question possesses a legitimate state aim. The authors argue that the legislations in question do not possess a legitimate state aim, since breaking down of E2EE is not a legitimate state aim. The Government’s primary argument is that E2EE acts as a great deterrent against LEA’s investigation capabilities, and grants protection to criminals. However, this is untrue because breaking down the E2E encryption is not the only way the LEA’s can investigate. There are equally effective investigative alternatives. With the advent of technology and the interconnected network web created by it, technology can be accordingly leveraged to the advantage of the LEAs.</p>

<p>Just in India, there exists more than 1.18 billion mobile connections, 700 million internet users, and 600 million mobile phones, which is rising by 25 million every quarter, and each of the mentioned leaves a digital trail. These digital trails could be used by the LEAs via data analytic techniques, and combat crime and terrorism, thus making their claim of being interrupted by E2EE invalid. Moreover, breaking E2EE would mostly affect citizens since terrorists usually use far more sophisticated technology. Additionally, scientific research has proved that the Government possesses  well-established “workarounds”  encryption, which can be deployed without sacrificing the right to privacy of every Indian user, by breaking E2EE. The same is further supplemented by real-life incidents, such as the infamous case of US San Bernardino Shooting. In the said case, the FBI fought a legal battle against Apple, for the sake of creating a backdoor in the iPhone used by the attackers. Apple greatly resisted the same, and despite their refusal to grant access, the FBI still managed to access the iPhone, with the use of a third-party which deployed work-arounds the iPhone’s encryption system.</p>

<p>Hence, since there exists no necessity of breaking E2EE, the challenged legislations do not possess a legitimate state aim and fail this prong of the test.</p>

<p>C.  Proportionality
The last prong of the Puttaswamy I test is the proportionality standard, which ensures that the nature and quality of the encroachment on the right to privacy are not disproportionate to the purpose of the law. The Supreme Court has held a similar stance in the cases such as Kerala State Beverages (M&amp;M) Corp. Ltd. v. P.P. Suresh, Om Kumar and Ors. vs Union of India, which have clarified that infringement of fundamental rights must be done via the “least restrictive alternative”.</p>

<p>In the present scenario, the legislations in question lead to the violation of the right to privacy of each of the million Indian users who use the affected platforms since, even keeping the technological aspect aside, there is no way to predict which message would be targeted for interception. This consequently contrasts with various Supreme Court judgments such as Gobind v. State of M.P., and Malak Singh v. State of P&amp;H, which have held that surveillance must only be restricted to those who show the possibility of committing crimes. The present legislations affect every Indian user, thus blatantly ignoring the requirement of restrictive surveillance.</p>

<p>Additionally, it must be noted that breaking E2EE would have adverse effects of unimaginable proportions, since it would infringe on human rights and the privacy of many groups such as journalists, attorney/doctor client privileges, financially sensitive information and more. Encryption is sine quo non for cyber security, and more importantly, national security. Lastly, as argued earlier, the Government possesses numerous workarounds in encryption, meaning breaking E2EE is not the “least restrictive alternative”. Thus, the challenged legislations do not meet the proportionality standard.</p>

<p>Hence, to summarise, while the legislations meet the valid law prong, they do not meet the prongs of legitimate state aim and proportionality, and thus do not pass the test laid in Puttaswamy I. To conclude, the legislations are violative of Article 21 and unconstitutional.</p>

<p>IV. The Way Forward
The Supreme Court of India in the landmark case of Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India famously remarked that sacrificing fundamental rights “on the anvil of fervid desire to find instantaneous solutions to systemic problems” would lead to dangerous circumstances. These concerns have unfortunately come to prophetically materialise into reality in the present scenario.
​
In pursuit of finding an instantaneous solution to the problems faced by E2EE, which could have easily been circumvented, the Government has attempted to completely ban its implementation, haemorrhaging the fundamental right to privacy of millions of Indian citizens. Thus, the authors sincerely hope that Courts strike down Rule 4(2) of the IT Rules, and that the Government withdraws Section 24(2)(a) from the Draft Telecom Bill, for the noble purpose of protecting the fundamental right to privacy of the citizens of India.</p>]]></content><author><name>Jindal Digest</name></author><category term="blogs" /><category term="contributors" /><category term="Tech" /><category term="Personal" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Read our latest legal insights and analysis from expert contributors.]]></summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://unsplash.it/1200/800?image=1059" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://unsplash.it/1200/800?image=1059" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">Grant Of Injunctive Relief In Patent Infringement Cases</title><link href="https://jindaldigest.github.io/2023/02/15/Grant-of-Injunctive-Relief-in-Patent-Infringement-Cases/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Grant Of Injunctive Relief In Patent Infringement Cases" /><published>2023-02-15T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2023-02-15T00:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://jindaldigest.github.io/2023/02/15/Grant-of-Injunctive-Relief-in-Patent-Infringement-Cases</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://jindaldigest.github.io/2023/02/15/Grant-of-Injunctive-Relief-in-Patent-Infringement-Cases/"><![CDATA[<hr />
<p>layout: post
title:  “Grant of Injunctive Relief in Patent Infringement Cases: A Comparative Analysis”
date:   2023-02-15 11:17:11 +0000
categories: [Tech, Personal]
featured: true
image: https://pin.it/3PLLj86Sx</p>

<p>—﻿<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606074932/https:/jindaldigest.weebly.com/blog-781581/grant-of-injunctive-relief-in-patent-infringement-cases-a-comparative-analysis"><strong>Grant of Injunctive Relief in Patent Infringement Cases: A Comparative Analysis</strong></a></p>

<p><strong>By Nivrithi Kailash</strong></p>

<p><strong>​Introduction:</strong></p>

<p>An injunction is a judicial process whereby a party is required to do, or to refrain from doing, any particular act. The TRIPS agreement sets out the minimum standards of protection of IPR to be provided by each member. The agreement also allows the grant of injunctions as remedy for enforcement of IPR, but does not mandate its availability, thus recognizing that the grant of injunction is discretionary. It mandates fair and reasonable procedures for enforcement of IPR, without unreasonable delay.</p>

<p>​This article will explain and analyse the discretion exercised by courts in the grant of injunctions in cases of patent infringement in two member countries: India and US, with the focus being on Indian jurisprudence.</p>

<p>**India:</p>

<p>Section 108** of the Patents Act includes the grant of injunctions as a relief for cases of patent infringement, subject to such terms as the court thinks fit. Thus, the grant of injunctions is a discretionary remedy, and is subject to sections 37 and 38 of the Specific Relief Act. Both temporary and permanent injunctions are provided for. A temporary injunction may be granted at any stage of the suit, while a permanent injunction can only be granted upon the merits of the suit.</p>

<p><strong>Temporary Injunctions</strong></p>

<p>Temporary injunctions are governed by the CPC, and are generally granted before the case has been decided on merits. Therefore, the principles of equity would apply which requires that: First, a prima facie case has been made out; Second, the defendant demonstrates a risk of irreparable injury, i.e. the plaintiff cannot be adequately compensated in monetary damages; Third, the balance of convenience must be in favour of the plaintiff, i.e. that plaintiff’s need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected from injury resulting from being prevented from exercising his legal right. The court may also keep in mind other special factors to be taken into consideration in the particular circumstances of individual cases. Thus, room is left open for various considerations exclusive to patent infringement.</p>

<p>In <strong><em>Franz Xaver Huemer</em></strong>, the court while observing the serious effect of such practices on the Indian market and economy, held that a plaintiff who has registered a patent in India but has not used it in India cannot, in equity, be granted a temporary injunction. Sandeep Jaidka further posited that as the patent had not been utilized in the commercial market, but the defendant had been manufacturing and supplying the product and had made considerable investment, the balance of convenience would tilt in his favour. Therefore, there exists a clear jurisprudential proclivity to limit the exercise of this discretionary remedy to those situations where the plaintiff utilizes the patent in the domestic market.</p>

<p>In <strong><em>Novartis Ag</em></strong>, a case dealing with life-saving pharmaceuticals, the court included larger public interest as a facet of balance of convenience. However, this doctrine could not be a complete exception to the equitable principles, as otherwise the patent-holders rights would be undermined, and the injunction was granted.</p>

<p>The case of <strong><em>Sterlite technologies</em></strong> granted an interim injunction despite observing that it was not possible to form a prima facie opinion. The court explained how the rights of both parties would be balanced, by saying that the defendant has two available defences : 1) proving its product or process to be different and , 2) challenging the validity of the patent. If the first defence is taken, the interim order would not cause harm. If the second defence is taken, interim order can be made subject to the condition that no consequences of violating the order would follow if he succeeds. However, if he fails, plaintiff would also be able to claim the consequences of violation of interim order. No authorities were cited for this reasoning and it was emphasized that such experimentation was the need of the hour. However, in a <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606074932/https:/indiankanoon.org/doc/183720579/">subsequent suit</a> this reasoning was disapproved of.</p>

<p><strong>Permanent Injunctions:</strong></p>

<p>Section 38, specific relief act, provides that permanent injunctions may be granted where, there is no standard for ascertaining damage caused, or likely to be caused; and where monetary compensation would not afford adequate relief.</p>

<p>However, there is no real clarity of these or any other considerations taken into account by the courts while exercising their discretion for grant of permanent injunctions in cases of patent infringement, as the cases where permanent injunctions have been granted are far and few. In both the cases of <strong><em>Merck v. Glenmark</em></strong> and <strong><em>Shogun Organics Ltd</em></strong>, a reading of the judgement would reveal that the courts have only decided, on merits, that the patentee’s rights have been infringed. After coming to this conclusion, permanent injunction was granted. Further, in Cipla Ltd, though infringement was established, an injunction was not granted as the patent was going to expire in less than 5 months, and injunction had not been granted at the interim stage. Instead, damages were awarded.</p>

<p><strong>United States:</strong></p>

<p>The <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606074932/https:/www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/35/283">US Patent Act</a> provides for the grant of inunctions in accordance with the principles of equity, on the terms deemed reasonable by the court. However, an empirical study revealed that the US courts prior to the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606074932/https:/supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/547/388/"><em>eBay case</em></a> granted a permanent injunction automatically upon resolving the suit in favour of the patentee on merits. In this case, the US supreme court held that the four considerations would need to be satisfied for an order of injunction: <em>First</em>, the plaintiff suffers an irreparable injury; <em>Second</em>, that the remedies available at law are inadequate; <em>Third</em>, the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff; <em>Fourth</em>, public interest would not be disserved. Post the <em>eBay case</em>, courts in the US do not grant injunctions automatically unless the test of the <em>eBay case</em> is met and injunctions have been granted only 72.5% of the time.</p>

<p>US courts tailored reliefs to avoid inequitable results in particular cases. For instance, while granting injunctions, the court would delay the date from which it would be effective – thereby avoiding the hardships that would be caused by the injunction coming into effect immediately. Other examples include stay of the injunction to allow for redesigning, or a sunset provision allowing the infringer to sell into an existing market. Particularly in cases where there is a significant public interest, such as medical equipment or pharmaceuticals, the court may grant an ongoing royalty to compensate for future infringement.</p>

<p><strong>Analysis and Comparison:</strong></p>

<p>In India it is abundantly clear that courts rely heavily on interim relief. A study, found that in more than 60% of the cases between 2000 and 2016, interlocutory injunction was granted.</p>

<p>Jurisprudential preferences of courts in different jurisdictions is also apparent in how they deal with each of the individual prongs of the tripartite equitable test. For instance, in relation to the establishment of a prima facie case, the leading English case of <strong><em>American Cyanamid Co</em></strong> has said that all that needs to be determined is if “there is a serious question to be tried”. However, Indian courts have not followed such a rigid approach, but have looked for prima facie validity of the patent and prima facie proof of infringement. This approach is in line with a slew of English cases which state that such rigid fulfilment of principle of prima facie might disproportionately affect poor companies. Despite this, one commentator, observing the frequent grant of injunction at the interim stage, and that subsequently permanent injunction is granted only in 30% of the cases, has suggested that there needs to be even stricter thresholds with establishment of prima facie case.</p>

<p>Further, given the inordinate delays of the court system, interim injunctions subsist for the majority of the lifetime of the patent, and are granted after exhaustive judgements. This trend has also been observed by the SC in <strong><em>Ms. Az Tech</em></strong>. This amounts in reality to a mini-trial being held at the interim stage and virtual decision on merits.</p>

<p>On the other hand, permanent injunctions are rarely granted in India and are granted without discussion of equitable principles. This may be due to the extensive analysis of such principles which has already happened at the interim stage, and/or an automatic assumption arising in relation to intellectual property due to its nature as the right to exclude, and the difficulties associated with calculating damages. It is with regard to this that major differences can be observed between the two jurisdictions. In the US, subsequent to the eBay case, there is no doubt that courts must satisfy the tests of equity set out before granting permanent injunctions. Further, the US Patent Act itself mandates that permanent injunctions must be granted on the basis of equitable principles, whereas the Indian Patent Act imposes no such condition, leaving it entirely to the discretion of the court
.
Moreover, as explained above, US courts tailors the grant of injunctive reliefs in many cases in the interests of equity, which is not done by courts in India. In the case of <strong><em>Novartis Ag</em></strong>, the court noted the possibility of moulding relief by granting ongoing royalty (instead of injunction) in cases of outweighing public interest. However, with regards to the case before it, the court failed to do so on the ground that the defendant had not placed adequate material on record. There seems to have been an attempt at moulding of injunctive relief in Sterlite, but that ruling of the single judge has been disapproved of by a double bench.</p>

<p><strong>Conclusion:</strong></p>

<p>Indian courts have looked extensively at the parameters for the grant of injunction, including those specific to patent infringement, atleast at the interim stage. The robustness of the patent litigation framework could be bolstered by bearing in mind the following considerations: First, Indian courts should aim at expediting patent matters by ensuring that the interlocutory or interim stage does not subsist for a prolonged period of time. Second, courts could attempt to identify and articulate a threshold for the grant of permanent injunctions; this would serve as a productive guiding principle for courts in dealing with infringement applications. A natural corollary of this would be a greater synergy between the Indian patent framework and the TRIPS Agreement. Moreover, Indian courts could look to American courts and mould the reliefs granted depending on the specific fact situation, especially in light of the emphasis laid by the courts on factors like public interest and the effect of non-user on the Indian market and economy.</p>]]></content><author><name>Jindal Digest</name></author><category term="blogs" /><category term="editors" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Read our latest legal insights and analysis from expert contributors.]]></summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://jindaldigest.github.io/assets/default-post-image.jpg" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://jindaldigest.github.io/assets/default-post-image.jpg" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">Report on the Digital Personal Data Protection Bill 2022</title><link href="https://jindaldigest.github.io/2023/02/13/Report-on-the-Digital-Personal-Data-Protection-Bill-2022/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Report on the Digital Personal Data Protection Bill 2022" /><published>2023-02-13T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2023-02-13T00:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://jindaldigest.github.io/2023/02/13/Report-on-the-Digital-Personal-Data-Protection-Bill-2022</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://jindaldigest.github.io/2023/02/13/Report-on-the-Digital-Personal-Data-Protection-Bill-2022/"><![CDATA[<p><strong><em>By the JDCIL Editorial Team</em></strong></p>

<p>The Supreme Court of India has recognized privacy as fundamental right in India and an important aspect of personal freedom and autonomy. In order to provide an operative framework that lays down the privacy rights of Indian citizens, and the roles and responsibilities of companies that deal with data, the Indian government has been attempting to legislate a Personal Data Protection Bill. The Digital Personal Data Protection Bill (2022) (“DPDP”) is the latest in a series of Bills put forth by the government for public consultation. </p>

<p>In this report, the editorial team at JDCIL has sought to provide an in- depth analysis of the DPDP by analyzing its compatibility with India’s established privacy jurisprudence, the recommendations of the BN Srikrishna Committee Report and the Joint Parliamentary Committee. We conclude that while the value placed on privacy can vary depending on cultural, social, and political factors, it cannot be sacrificed at the altar of an amorphous state or public interest. Active efforts must be made to ensure that in a climate where data breaches are common and data has become more valuable that oil, appropriate legal safeguards are in place to ensure that data privacy of India’s citizens are secure.
​</p>

<hr />
<p><img src="Aspose.Words.3251972d-447c-41b1-a61f-c53f115df54b.001.png" alt="" /></p>

<p>|<strong>report_on_the_personal_data_protection_bill_2022_-_jdcil.pdf</strong>|
| :- |</p>

<p><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606075037/https:/jindaldigest.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134073438/report_on_the_personal_data_protection_bill_2022_-_jdcil.pdf" title="Download file: report_on_the_personal_data_protection_bill_2022_-_jdcil.pdf"><strong>Download File</strong></a></p>

<hr />

<p><strong>BACKGROUND</strong> </p>

<p>The <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606075037/https:/www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/The%20Digital%20Personal%20Data%20Potection%20Bill%2C%202022_0.pdf">Digital Personal Data Protection Bill, 2022</a> (“DPDP”) is the fourth iteration of the Data Protection Bills series introduced in the Indian Parliament. Given India’s rampant growth in the field of technology in various segments such as finance, business, start-ups, medicine, and law, amongst a gamut of other fields, the significance of an enforceable data protection mechanism is more important than ever. Drafted to solidify and concretize the data protection framework within the Indian jurisdiction, the DPDP re-envisions India’s data protection framework by standing out from its previous iterations. Of the many ways in which the DPDP stands out from the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 (“2019 bill), the most conspicuous one is how personal data is defined. Personal data is no longer defined through a detailed categorical matrix. Personal data is one monolithic, all-encompassing category. It particularly focuses on <em>digitized</em> personal data.</p>

<p>Concerning its territorial applicability, the DPDP has enforceability within India if the personal digital data is being processed within it and has extra-territorial applicability if such processing of digital personal data is connected with data principals in India.</p>

<p>At its very core, the DPDP principally draws heavily from <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606075037/https:/sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/PDPA2012">Singapore’s Data Protection Act, 2012</a>, unlike the previous drafts which primarily used the European Union’s General Data Protection Rules (“GDPR”) as the basis for formulating India’s Data Protection framework. The current draft is also a more concise, condensed and shorter document. Many critique that the condensation of the document allows the Central Government with more discretion in decision-making where the law is not completely unambiguous.</p>

<p>Data Fiduciaries also enjoy a certain degree of freedom, especially when it comes to the retention of data of the data principal. The DPDP states that the data fiduciaries must cease to retain and anonymize the data it has processed when it <strong><em>reasonably</em></strong> believes that the purpose of retaining the data is complete and the data is no longer required for any legal or business purpose. It is noteworthy to mention that <em>business purpose</em> is not defined and left as a broad category. This would have its own positive and negative set of repercussions.</p>

<p>Additionally, the DPDP lays down the obligations of the data fiduciary to undertake tasks to ensure the completeness and accuracy of the data it collects and processes. The obligations of the data processors have also been included.</p>

<p>The rights of the data principals have been explicitly stated and the same includes (a) the right to obtain any information required on the data being processed, (b) the right to the erasure of their data or any relevant corrections to the data to ensure its accuracy, (c) the right to grievance redressal, to name a few. Children are also taken within the ambit of data principles and the consent to process their data must be taken from their legal guardian or parent.</p>

<p>The DPDP has included Significant Data Fiduciaries as another category of stakeholders relevant to the data protection framework. They may be notified to take actions based on the sensitivity of the data and the volume of data, any risk to India’s sovereignty, etc.</p>

<p>The DPDP also lays down the constitution of a Data Protection Board which would be an independent authority responsible for enforcing and penalizing any individual or legal entity that doesn’t work in compliance with the said provisions. The Board can also conduct hearings, examine relevant parties on oath, and summon parties as well. However, the Board is not authorized to take custody of any equipment. While in the 2019 Bill, the Central Government could also appoint the selection committee to the Data Protection Authority, under the DPDP, the Government can appoint the chief executive of the Board and frame the terms and conditions of the functioning of the Board.</p>

<p>The DPDP would have an overriding effect over all other laws that conflict with the provisions of the DPDP and may apply in addition to some of the existing sectoral laws and may supersede such laws in a few sectors such as medicine, finance, etc. which have or require data governance frameworks. Concerning penalties, the maximum cap is set at Rs. 500 Crores in each instance. While the previous 2019 Bill allowed for the flexibility of levying penalties on a case-by-case basis, the DPDP allows only for amendments to penalties by the Government and sets an upper limit or cap for the penalties.</p>

<p>The following report would look at the elements of the DPDP that run contrary to established principles in the right to privacy jurisprudence in India. The most important issue the report seeks to analyze is whether the 2022 DPDP will enhance or deplete the privacy rights of Indian citizens.</p>

<p><strong>ANALYSIS</strong></p>

<p><strong>​I.              Scope and Application</strong></p>

<p>The <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606075037/https:/www.meity.gov.in/content/information-technology-act-2000-0">Information Technology Act, 2000</a> is the central legislation that regulates online transactions/ affairs. This covers under its purview violation of privacy that constitutes a digital offence under the act. The <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606075037/https:/cis-india.org/internet-governance/proposed-privacy-bill">Right to Privacy Bill, 2011</a> was the first attempt under the UPA Government to address data regulation that was objected to by intelligence agencies owing to the premature architecture of the regulation proposed. Surveillance is addressed through Section 62 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 read with Information Technology Rules, 2009, however, the application has been claimed to be open-ended; enabling the government to exercise its powers without any effective restriction. The element of transparency was emphasized by the court in <em>People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606075037/https:/jindaldigest.weebly.com/blog-781581/report-on-the-personal-data-protection-bill-2022#_ftn1"><strong>[1]</strong>*</a></em> wherein, government surveillance was addressed for the first time. However, how data is processed and the growing use of Internet Services necessitating the protection of data through special legislation was discussed by the Apex Court in Justice <em>K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) &amp; Anr. versus Union of India &amp; Ors<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606075037/https:/jindaldigest.weebly.com/blog-781581/report-on-the-personal-data-protection-bill-2022#_ftn2"><strong>[2]</strong>*</a></em>. This led to the formation of the Committee led by Justice BN Srikrishna<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606075037/https:/jindaldigest.weebly.com/blog-781581/report-on-the-personal-data-protection-bill-2022#_ftn3">[3]</a> which laid out a set of specific regulations for the protection of data through a draft data protection bill that was formulated in subsequent years.</p>

<p>The proposed DPDP, like its predecessors, applies to digital personal data and its processing. Herein, such data is collected</p>

<ol>
  <li>online through a data principle or</li>
  <li>offline and then digitalized.</li>
</ol>

<p>The accuracy of such collected and processed data lies on the data fiduciary wherein, the compliance under provisions set out under the proposed bill is the responsibility of the data fiduciary and the compliance of the data principal is not relevant to such application.</p>

<p>The proposed Law has extra-territorial application and hence, will be applied if personal data is processed outside the country if the same is done about the activities of data principals located within the country. Furthermore, under the act, processing of any personal data that is about the attribute and behavior of a data principal is referred to as profiling and thus, sets out the categories of how data processing will be applicable.</p>

<p>Unlike the earlier iterations of the legislation, the types of data have not been distinguished between and apply to all sets of personal data. However, the provisions do not apply to</p>

<ol>
  <li>non-automated processing of personal data and </li>
  <li>offline personal data.</li>
</ol>

<p>The obligation of an itemized notice under the proposed law falls on the fiduciary if data is collected for the proposed processing and hence, solidifies the consent-based mechanism the earlier legislations intended.</p>

<p>The proposed law provides an exemption for circumstances where personal data is processed to enforce a legal right, performed judicial or quasi-judicial function, processed in the interest of prevision of a law being contravened and where the data principal is not within the territory of India. It is pertinent to mention that such obligations under the proposed law can be exempted through a notification passed by the Central Government to allow an instrumentality of the state to derogate from the same in the interest of sovereignty and the integrity of India along with research purposes without any procedural restriction. Furthermore, even certain data fiduciaries can be exempt from the application of Section 6, Section 9, Section 10, Section 11, and Section 12 by way of a notification by the Central Government which confers a large degree of autonomy for such exemptions.</p>

<p><strong>II.            Deemed Consent</strong></p>

<p>In the domain of data protection, “deemed consent” refers to a situation where an individual is considered to have given their consent to the collection, storage, and use of their personal data, even if they have not explicitly provided it. This can occur in several ways, such as when an individual has not taken steps to opt out of data collection, or when they have not exercised their right to object to the processing of their data.</p>

<p>Deemed consent is usually used in situations where the collection and use of personal data are considered to be in the individual’s best interest, such as in the case of medical research or fraud prevention. However, deemed consent must not be used as a way to bypass obtaining explicit consent from individuals, and that other measures such as providing clear and specific information about data processing activities and providing individuals with an easy way to opt out should be implemented.</p>

<p>The provision on ‘deemed consent’ in the DPDP draws inspiration from Section 15 of the Personal Data Protection Act, 2012, Singapore. The DPDP provides additional criteria for deemed consent in cases concerning the broadly defined grounds of ‘public interest’ and ‘fair and reasonable’ purpose. The following are the infirmities with section 8 of the DPDP and its effects on data privacy:</p>

<ul>
  <li>The <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606075037/https:/www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Personal_Data_Protection_Bill,2018.pdf">Personal Data Protection Bill, 2018</a> (“2018 bill”) made a distinction between sensitive personal data and non-sensitive personal data. For instance, under section 16 of the 2018 bill, employment was a basis for processing only non-sensitive personal data. The DPDP is couched in broader terms wherein section 8(7) gives employers the authority to process sensitive information of the data principal without express consent. In the old Bill, details such as sexual orientation, sex life, transgender status, caste, religious affiliation etc. were covered under ‘sensitive personal data’. If employers can obtain broad-based consent to process such sensitive information of their employees it may lead to unfettered workplace discrimination of gender, sexual, caste, and religious minorities.</li>
  <li>The ‘public interest’ exception is couched in extremely broad terms and is incompatible with the grounds mentioned under section 8(8) of DPDP. It is unclear how the processing of information for ‘credit scoring’ is in furtherance of public interest. Credit scoring involves the collection of highly sensitive personal information including financial data and history. Collection of such data without the express consent of the principal constitutes a clear threat to their privacy. Moreover, non-disclosure of risks associated with this data, such as the fact that aggregation of such sensitive data makes the service providers targets for breaches of data security, is highly problematic.</li>
  <li>It is unclear whether ‘deemed consent’ can be withdrawn by the data principal. If it can be withdrawn, then the entire purpose of certain grounds under section 8 of DPDP gets defeated. For instance, section 8(3) provides for deemed consent for the processing of data for compliance with any judgment or order issued under the law. It is odd to permit a data principal to withdraw her consent concerning the performance of legal obligations.</li>
</ul>

<p><strong>III.          Section 18: Consent Requirements</strong></p>

<p>Section 18, DPDP exempts data fiduciaries from consent requirements and other obligations under certain specified circumstances such as for the performance of judicial functions, enforcement of legal rights and claims etc. The primary shortcomings of the provision are as follows:</p>

<ul>
  <li>Section 18(1)(b), DPDP exempts courts or tribunals or other judicial authorities from complying with certain provisions of the bill for processing personal data for the performance of judicial/quasi-judicial functions. With globalization and the increase in the scale of commerce, more and more disputes are being referred to arbitration, a lot of which are carried out by foreign institutions. The limited applicability of this provision may hinder the speedy resolution of disputes in foreign institutional arbitrations.</li>
  <li>Section 18(2)(a), DPDP empowers the Central Government to exempt instrumentalities of the state from the application of the provisions of the Bill. Such a provision confers excessive powers on the government which are capable of being misused. Since this would amount to an infringement of the Right to Privacy, which has been read under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, it should be clarified that such exemption would be subject to the four-pronged proportionality requirement laid down in the <em>Puttaswamy</em> judgment.</li>
  <li>Instrumentalities of the state are exempt from the application of the S. 9(6) requirement of erasing personal data after its purpose has been fulfilled as per S. 18. This allows the government to arbitrarily retain data for an indefinite period, which would amount to a violation of citizen’s privacy without any procedural safeguards.</li>
</ul>

<p><strong>IV.          Compliance with BN Srikrishna Committee Report</strong></p>

<p>The <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606075037/https:/www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Data_Protection_Committee_Report.pdf">BN Srikrishna Committee report</a> (“report”/“committee”) looked at the current regime for data protection in three other jurisdictions, namely the EU, the US and China. It observed that the data protection regime of each jurisdiction depends particularly on the function for which the data protection law exists and more generally reflects each jurisdiction’s understanding of the relationship between the citizen and the state. For example, China frames its law with the interests of the collective as the focus, based on the privilege of the collective over the individual. In Europe on the other hand, data protection norms are founded on the need to uphold individual dignity, and the state is viewed as having a responsibility to protect such individual interests. Thus, the data protection regime in India would need to be unique based on India’s understanding of its citizen-state relationship, and its motivations for a data protection law.</p>

<p>The right to privacy has been held as a fundamental right in the <em>Puttaswamy</em> Judgement, and the regulatory framework in India must therefore reflect the right to privacy in accordance with this judgment. In light of this, the committee report states that the framework needs to be such that it protects individual autonomy and privacy, which can be achieved through the rubric of a free and fair digital economy. Further, the twin objective of the bill must be to ensure the protection of personal data while facilitating the growth of the digital economy. The report thus went on to give recommendations to achieve a free and fair digital economy.</p>

<p>·      <strong>Fiduciary relationship between individuals and the controller of data:</strong> </p>

<p>The report says that the relationship between the individual and the service provider must be viewed as a fiduciary relationship, in light of its aspiration to build a free and fair digital economy. Freedom refers to enhancing the autonomy of individuals about their personal data in deciding its processing (this would lead to an ease of flow of personal data). While fairness refers to respecting the rights of the individual concerning her personal data, keeping in mind the existing inequality in bargaining power between individuals and entities that process such personal data (which needs to be mitigated). For this to be achieved the person to whom the data relates is the <strong>data principal</strong>- that is, the focal actor in the digital economy. The person/persons who control the data are referred to as fiduciaries to emphasize that relationship between the individual and entities with whom the individual shares her personal data is based on a fundamental expectation of trust. Thus, controllers of data have a duty of care to deal with such data fairly and responsibly for purposes reasonably expected by the principals, making them <strong>data fiduciaries.</strong> Both the 2019 bill  and the DPDP, adopt this terminology describing the stakeholders as data principal (the individual to whom the personal data relates) and data fiduciary (any person who alone or in conjunction with other persons determines the purpose and means of the processing of personal data) respectively.</p>

<p><strong>·      Obligations of fiduciaries:</strong></p>

<p>To prevent abuse of power by fiduciaries, the report recommended that fiduciaries should have:</p>

<ol>
  <li>the obligation to process data fairly and reasonably, and</li>
  <li>the obligation to give notice to the individual at the time of collecting data to various points in the interim.</li>
</ol>

<p>While the obligation to process data fairly and reasonably is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the DPDP, it flows from the usage of the term data fiduciary, as explained above. Further, under the DPDP, the data principal must be provided with a notice based on which she can consent to the processing of his/ her data, however, the bill has reduced the information that is required to be provided in the notice to the data fiduciary. While previous versions of this bill required information such as rights of the principal, redressal mechanism, retention period of information, etc. to be provided, the current bill only requires the personal data being collected, and the purpose of processing the data to be disclosed. This may have been done to shorten and simplify the notice, to make it more comprehensible for data principals, however, the notice becomes less comprehensive as a result. It may be possible to use other tools such as infographics, to make a notice which is both comprehensive and comprehensible.</p>

<p><strong>·      Definition of personal data:</strong></p>

<p>The report/committee noted that it is important to define what constitutes personal data, defining it to include data from which an individual may be identified or identifiable, either directly or indirectly.  The committee also sought to distinguish personal data protection from the protection of sensitive personal data (data, related to intimate matters, the processing of which could result in greater harm to the individual), and provide additional protection for the processing of such data. While the DPDP adopts the definition of personal data, it does not include the concept of “sensitive personal data”. By ignoring this concept, the bill also does not include additional protections for such data. </p>

<p><strong>·      Consent-based processing:</strong></p>

<p>The committee noted that informed or meaningful consent must be treated as a pre-condition for processing personal data. Further, for certain vulnerable groups, such as children, and sensitive personal data, a data protection law must sufficiently protect their interests, while considering their vulnerability, and exposure to risks online. </p>

<p>In the DPDP, consent of the data principal is a precondition to the processing of data by the data fiduciary. The DPDP also imposes additional obligations for the processing of the personal data of children under section 10. Under this provision, the data fiduciary is obligated to obtain verifiable parental consent, not to undertake such processing of personal data that is likely to cause harm to a child, and not to undertake tracking or behavioural monitoring of children or targeted advertising directed at children. However, these protections are subject to the exception contained in sub-clause 4 of the provisions itself- which states that the protections shall not apply to the processing of the personal data of a child for “such purposes, as may be prescribed”.</p>

<p><strong>·      Non-consensual processing:</strong></p>

<p>The committee noted that it is not possible to obtain the consent of the individual in all circumstances, keeping in mind the balance that needs to be stuck between the right to privacy and other legitimate state aims, and identifies four grounds for processing data without consent: (i) where processing is relevant for the state to discharge its welfare functions, (ii) to comply with the law or with court orders in India, (iii) when necessitated by the requirement to act promptly (to save a life, for instance), and (iv) in employment contracts, in limited situations (such, as where giving the consent requires an unreasonable effort for the employer).</p>

<p>Similarly, the DPDP introduces the concept of deemed consent. The bill thus recognizes situations in which consent doesn’t need to be actually given by the data principle; consent will be deemed to be given.  The provisions under the bill however have a wider scope of deemed consent. Apart from the four grounds identified by the committee, consent is also deemed to be given in cases of public interest (such as prevention and detection of fraud, recovery of debt, credit scoring, etc.), and for any fair and reasonable purpose as may be prescribed. This allows the government to further prescribe situations in which consent would be waived.  Therefore, under the Bill, the need for consent, and consequently the right to privacy and autonomy is minimised in comparison to the Committee report.</p>

<p><strong>·      Rights of the data principal:</strong></p>

<p>The report explains that the rights of the individual are based on the principles of autonomy, self-determination, transparency, and accountability to give individuals control over their data. These rights were categorized into:</p>

<ol>
  <li>the right to access, confirm and correction of data,</li>
  <li>the right to object to data processing, automated decision-making, direct marketing,</li>
  <li>right to data portability,</li>
  <li>the right to be forgotten.</li>
</ol>

<p>Chapter III of the DPDP talks about the rights of the data principal. It includes the right to information about personal data, the right to correction and erasure of personal data, the right to grievance redressal, and the right to nominate. Thus, most of the rights prescribed in the report are recognized by the DPDP, and the additional right to nominate is also recognized. By the insertion of this right, the DPDP allows a data principal in the event of death or incapacity to nominate another individual to exercise all the rights of the data principal. It thus recognizes the right of an individual to have his personal data protected post- mortem. However, the right to be forgotten is not included. The right to portability, which could have allowed users to port or systematically transfer personal data from one data fiduciary to another data fiduciary has also not been included and this may interfere with the spirit of consumer welfare and competitiveness among data fiduciaries.</p>

<p>With this right to be forgotten not being included in the DPDP, the only way to erase personal data once it has been given to a data fiduciary is through the right or erasure, which only permits the erasing of personal data that is no longer necessary for the purpose for which it was processed unless retention is necessary for a legal purpose. Whereas under the right to be forgotten, the data principal can additionally stop the processing (which includes storage) of data in case of withdrawal of consent, and if such processing was made contrary to law. Thus, the autonomy of the individual over his/her personal data is minimised in the DPDP.</p>

<p>The inclusion of duties of the data principal is not found in either the recommendations of the BN Krishnaswamy Committee report, or in older versions of the Bill, and flows from the idea that every right has a corresponding duty. The inclusion of these duties may simplify litigation regarding digital personal data. However, it is unclear whether the duties are enforceable and how they will be enforced.</p>

<p><strong>·      Enforcement models:</strong></p>

<p>The committee also recommended setting up a regulator, which would have the power to inquire into any violations of the data protection regime and take action against those responsible. The committee also recommended that the regulator may categorise certain fiduciaries as significant data fiduciaries based on their ability to cause greater harm to individuals and require them to undertake additional obligations.</p>

<p>Chapter 5 of the DPDP prescribes a compliance framework, provides for the formation of such an authority (data protection board) and gives it the powers to enquire into and ensure compliance with the provisions of the DPDP. The DPDP also recognizes the concept of having additional obligations for significant data fiduciaries but gives the power to notify certain fiduciaries as significant to the Central Government, rather than the regulatory authority under section 11(1). Thus, the DPDP allows the government (which may be a more involved stakeholder as a possible data fiduciary) to exercise the power rather than the relatively independent board. Furthermore, the selection and composition of the board shall be as may be prescribed, which means that it is left to the government to decide. This may result in a selection method or composition which does not allow the board to function as an independent authority.</p>

<p><strong>V.            Right to Privacy</strong></p>

<p>The Supreme Court in Puttaswamy has held that the right to privacy is a fundamental right flowing from the right to life and personal liberty as well as other fundamental rights securing individual liberty in the Constitution. The sphere of privacy includes a right to protect one’s identity, and this recognises the fact that all information about a person is fundamentally her own, and she is free to communicate or retain it for herself.</p>

<p>This right to autonomy and self-determination in respect of one’s personal data would thus form the primary value that any data protection framework serves. However, the framework would need to carefully balance the requirements of privacy coupled with other values and with the legitimate concerns of the State. Like other fundamental rights, privacy too can be restricted in well-defined circumstances. For such a restriction, three conditions need to be satisfied: first, there is a legitimate state interest in restricting the right; second, the restriction is necessary and proportionate to achieve the interest; third that the restriction is by law.<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606075037/https:/jindaldigest.weebly.com/blog-781581/report-on-the-personal-data-protection-bill-2022#_ftn4">[4]</a> According to the BN Srikrishna committee report the framework of a free and fair digital economy could provide a useful reference point for achieving this balance.</p>

<p>The concept of deemed consent, under section 8 of DPDP is a restriction on the right to privacy, as the personal data of the data principal may be processed without consent. The DPDP sets out specific situations in which deemed consent operates, and also permits deemed consent for any fair and reasonable purpose, taking into consideration (a) whether the legitimate interests of the Data Fiduciary in processing for that purpose outweigh any adverse effect on the rights of the Data Principal; (b) any public interest in processing for that purpose; and (c) the reasonable expectations of the Data Principal having regard to the context of the processing. The third condition is automatically met by all such provisions as they form part of a bill, which if passed by the Parliament would form a part of “law”. What remains to be seen is if each provision promotes a legitimate state interest and if such provision is necessary or proportional to achieve the legitimate interest. In light of these requirements, several previous drafts of data protection bills have been struck down amidst contentions of them not safeguarding the right to privacy. Thus, it is also relevant to examine the differences in protections of privacy between the current bill and the previous draft.</p>

<p><code class="language-plaintext highlighter-rouge"> </code>The 2019 bill also lays down some exceptions to the obtaining of consent (sections 12-14) and permits the government to specify any other reasonable purpose through regulations. However, the old bill lays down more requirements for exceptions to obtaining consent and mandates that where the Authority specifies a reasonable purpose, it shall also lay down such safeguards as may be appropriate to ensure the protection of the rights of the data principal. Thus, the new bill makes it easier for the government to bypass the requirement of consent and thus permits the autonomy of individuals over their own data to be bypassed more easily. While the specific provisions for which deemed consent applies may be for other legitimate state aims and may be proportional to the achievement of that aim, the bill permits the government to create more situations in which deemed consent operates without any safeguard or guarantee that the provisions will be proportional to a legitimate state aim.</p>

<p>The 2019 bill provided exemption from the provisions of the act for any agency of the Government for preventing incitement to the commission of a cognisable offence relating to the (i)sovereignty and integrity of India, (ii) security of the State, (iii) friendly relations with foreign states, (iv) public order, as well as for some other purposes. It also provided for the creation of a “sandbox”, wherein certain companies would be exempted from the provisions of the act for innovation in artificial intelligence, machine learning or any other emerging technology in the public interest. Thus, personal data would not be protected by the bill in these cases. The current bill re-introduces most of these provisions under section 18, DPDP (the only major difference is the removal of the sandbox provision). The exemption provided to the government again permits the government to infringe on privacy without any safeguards for ensuring proportionality with the state aim.</p>

<p>An independent regulating authority to ensure compliance with the provisions of the act is essential for the protection of privacy. Under the DPDP, however, the composition of the authority is left entirely to be prescribed by the government, whereas the old bill clearly prescribed the composition, not leaving it up to the executive wing of the government. Therefore, the possibility of the enforcement authority becoming nothing more than a puppet of the executive, which will affect the ability of the law to safeguard privacy, is much higher under the DPDP.  Keeping all this in mind, it can be said that the bill delegates too much power to the government without proper guidelines. To avoid long and complex legislation, the wording in DPDP is minimal, with the phrase as “may be prescribed” being used numerous times throughout the Bill. This gives the executive branch too much control in all areas of the Bill. Thus, the executive has the power to act capriciously, and excessively, thereby infringing on the fundamental right to privacy.</p>

<p><strong>VI.          Recommendations of the Joint Parliamentary Committee
​</strong>
The <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606075037/https:/www.dsci.in/sites/default/files/Summary-%20and-Primer-on-Joint-Parliamentary-Committee-Report-and-Data-Protection-Bill-2021.pdf">Joint Parliamentary Committee on the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019</a> (“JPC”) tabled its report in December 2021 post an extension and contained several recommendations along with a draft of the Data Protection Bill, 2021 which comprised of certain amendments to provide for a model framework for implementation. In this section, these recommendations and the respective framework will be juxtaposed with the current proposed law to understand how the same has been incorporated.</p>

<p>At the outset, the usage of the word ‘digital’ that preceded the phrase ‘privacy of individuals’ was critiqued in the report to limit the scope of data privacy holistically wherein, even the nature of exemptions being circumscribed to ensure the interest and security of the State were emphasized upon to provide context to such derogations. As discussed hereinabove, the abovementioned changes can be seen as partially incorporated under Section 4, DPDP</p>

<p>The 2019 bill talked about the way data was to be retained by a fiduciary which was found by the JPC to be fairly limited in the way such data is to be utilized and asked to introduce terms like ‘period’ that included such usage under its purview and did away with the temporal nature of such retention. The DPDP does not stipulate a similar period for retention however, it also does not clarify the period of cessation/ destruction of data.</p>

<p>Section 12 of the 2021 Bill through the JPC addressed the consent of data principals being taken before any processing and has been followed in the current proposed bill. However, the consent section of the current bill remains to be vague wherein, the nature of a consent manager and consent renewal is still not explicitly provided for.</p>

<p>As far as exemptions are considered, the autonomy of the central government was favoured in the JPC report as well wherein, through Section 35 of the 2021 Bill, where the committee conferred a wide degree of autonomy in such derogation which became a characteristic feature of the DPDP. However, the range of additional recommendations by the DPDP was given in the form of dissent for the proposed 2021 bill as well wherein, the blanket exemptions without providing for a limit on the period of such exemption were viewed to be a significant flaw. Moreover, limiting the application to digital personal data was criticized yet again and can still be seen as an applicative challenge owing to how the current proposed law has ignored this facet.</p>

<p><strong>RECOMMENDATIONS
​</strong></p>

<ul>
  <li>
    <p>It is necessary to bring back the distinction between ‘personal data’ and ‘sensitive personal data’ so that data fiduciaries such as employers are not able to process such sensitive information based on ‘deemed consent’. This would bring the Indian data protection regime in conformity with international standards, such as the GDPR which provides for special categories of data under <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606075037/https:/gdpr-info.eu/art-9-gdpr/">Article 9</a>.</p>
  </li>
  <li>
    <p>At present, the entire provision about deemed consent is extremely vague and unclear, especially since consent-based grounds for processing imply that such consent can be withdrawn, which could not have been the purpose of the provision. The ‘deemed consent’ mechanism of Singapore’s Data Protection Act, 2012 has also been widely <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606075037/https:/iapp.org/news/a/gdpr-matchup-singapores-personal-data-protection-act/%3e">criticized.</a> Like the GDPR, the current Bill can instead provide non-consent-based grounds for processing data wherever necessary.</p>
  </li>
  <li>
    <p>The provisions in the bill where consent is said to be deemed moves far beyond the standards set out in <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606075037/https:/gdpr-info.eu/art-6-gdpr/">Article 6</a> of the GDPR. The scope of public interest under section 8(8), DPDP must be narrowed and must not include things such as credit scoring and recovery of debt which have no nexus with the public interest. The DPDP can take guidance from the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606075037/https:/www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2022C00361">Australian Privacy Act, 1988</a>, which under Part IIIA extensively deals with credit reporting and the types of information financial institutions are permitted to receive.</p>
  </li>
  <li>
    <p>Procedural safeguards such as overriding public interest and proportionality must be specified in section 18(2)(a), DPDP.</p>
  </li>
  <li>
    <p>The exemption under section 18(1)(b), DPDP should also be extended to foreign courts and tribunals to ease the burden of compliance on parties opting for foreign jurisdictions for dispute resolution.</p>
  </li>
  <li>
    <p>Section 18(4), DPDP must be struck down and instrumentalities of the state too must be made subject to the requirement under section 9(6), DPDP. There is no clear reason given as to why the State is exempt from this requirement and the same is arbitrary and violates Article 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution.</p>
  </li>
  <li>
    <p>The GDPR, alongside the provision of a specific right to data subjects, explicitly mentions that the data controller shall facilitate the exercise of rights by the data subject, through transparent information, communication and modalities. Including such a provision in the Indian framework would go a long way in allowing data principals to effectively exercise their rights.</p>
  </li>
  <li>
    <p>The GDPR also includes the right to be forgotten and the right to portability, which, as explained previously, are conspicuously missing from the DPDP. The GDPR also gives the data subject the right to object to the lawfulness of the processing of data by the data fiduciary and explicitly provides that the data subject shall have the right not to be subject to decisions solely based on automated processing (including profiling) which significantly affects him/her.</p>
  </li>
  <li>
    <p>The provisions of the GDPR regarding the rights of data subjects are wordier and more complex than that of the DPDP. However, the GDPR succeeds in providing more safeguards for individuals’ data. The DPDP on the other hand has sacrificed providing adequate and detailed safeguards to data principals in the interest of short and easily readable provisions. Thus, the Indian Bill would benefit from increasing the scope of rights protected by the DPDP by adopting from both the GDPR and older versions of the bill.</p>
  </li>
</ul>

<p>​
<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606075037/https:/jindaldigest.weebly.com/blog-781581/report-on-the-personal-data-protection-bill-2022#_ftnref1">[1]</a> People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 568.</p>

<p><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606075037/https:/jindaldigest.weebly.com/blog-781581/report-on-the-personal-data-protection-bill-2022#_ftnref2">[2]</a> (2017) 10 SCC 1.</p>

<p><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606075037/https:/jindaldigest.weebly.com/blog-781581/report-on-the-personal-data-protection-bill-2022#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Committee of Experts under the Chairmanship of Justice B.N. Srikrishna, 2018.</p>

<p><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230606075037/https:/jindaldigest.weebly.com/blog-781581/report-on-the-personal-data-protection-bill-2022#_ftnref4">[4]</a> <em>K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India,</em> (2017) 10 SCC 1.</p>]]></content><author><name>Jindal Digest</name></author><category term="blogs" /><category term="editors" /><category term="Tech" /><category term="Personal" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Read our latest legal insights and analysis from expert contributors.]]></summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://pin.it/3PLLj86Sx" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://pin.it/3PLLj86Sx" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry><entry><title type="html">Re Examining The Stringent Public Interest Standard In Pharmaceutical Trademark Disputes</title><link href="https://jindaldigest.github.io/2023/01/22/RE-EXAMINING-THE-STRINGENT-PUBLIC-INTEREST-STANDARD-IN-PHARMACEUTICAL-TRADEMARK-DISPUTES/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Re Examining The Stringent Public Interest Standard In Pharmaceutical Trademark Disputes" /><published>2023-01-22T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2023-01-22T00:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://jindaldigest.github.io/2023/01/22/RE-EXAMINING-THE-STRINGENT-PUBLIC-INTEREST-STANDARD-IN-PHARMACEUTICAL-TRADEMARK-DISPUTES</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://jindaldigest.github.io/2023/01/22/RE-EXAMINING-THE-STRINGENT-PUBLIC-INTEREST-STANDARD-IN-PHARMACEUTICAL-TRADEMARK-DISPUTES/"><![CDATA[<hr />
<p>layout: post
title:  “RE-EXAMINING THE STRINGENT PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD IN PHARMACEUTICAL TRADEMARK DISPUTES”
date:   2023-01-22 11:17:11 +0000
categories: [Intellectual Property, Personal]
featured: true
image: https://pin.it/3PLLj86Sx ﻿<a href="HTTPS://WEB.ARCHIVE.ORG/WEB/20230124115944/HTTPS:/JINDALDIGEST.WEEBLY.COM/BLOG-781581/RE-EXAMINING-THE-STRINGENT-PUBLIC-INTEREST-STANDARD-IN-PHARMACEUTICAL-TRADEMARK-DISPUTES"><strong>RE-EXAMINING THE STRINGENT PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD IN PHARMACEUTICAL TRADEMARK DISPUTES</strong></a></p>

<p><strong>By Siddhaant Verma</strong></p>

<p><strong>Introduction</strong></p>

<p>A <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230124115944/https:/indiankanoon.org/doc/26244180/">recent decision</a> of the Delhi High Court has brought an important principle of pharmaceutical trademarks to the forefront. In trademark infringement suits that relate to pharmaceutical drugs, Indian courts adopt a higher than usual degree of scrutiny to assess the similarity between the marks. This principle was concretized by the Supreme Court in [<em>Cadila Healthcare v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals](https://web.archive.org/web/20230124115944/https:/indiankanoon.org/doc/1114158/)</em>,<em> which expressed the need for a greater level of care when dealing with pharmaceutical trademarks. </em>Prima facie,<em> this approach makes obvious sense. As the Apex Court explained— </em>“drugs are poisons, not sweets”.<em> Considering the enormous impact on public health, even slight confusion between two drugs may lead to detrimental consequences. Thus, even if there is a minor possibility that the public may confuse one medicine for another, courts will generally grant an injunction to restrain the use of the infringing mark given the compelling public interest. However, while </em>Cadila Healthcare<em> was correctly decided, the author shall argue that the judgment has not been considered in its proper context in subsequent decisions. Several courts have now needlessly employed an overbroad understanding of the ‘public interest standard’</em>,* which has led to the abandonment of the first principles of trademark law.</p>

<p><strong>Revisiting <em>Cadila Healthcare</em></strong></p>

<p>In <em>Cadila Healthcare,</em> the court was tasked with determining whether a drug named ‘Falcitab’ infringed on the appellant’s trademark ‘Falcigo’. It is pertinent to note that while both drugs were aimed at curing the same ailment, their chemical compositions were considerably different. The Court ultimately held that given the nature of the product, a stricter standard ought to apply to prevent the possibility of harm resulting from even a remote likelihood of confusion between the two drugs. However, the court made these observations in a very specific context. This test was only meant to apply only in situations where the drugs have distinct chemical compositions but are meant to cure the same illness. This is evident from the following excerpt of the judgment— <em>“The drugs have a marked difference in the compositions with completely different side effects, the test should be applied strictly as the possibility of harm resulting from any kind of confusion by the consumer can have unpleasant if not disastrous results. The courts need to be particularly vigilant where the defendants drug, of which passing off is alleged, is meant for curing the same ailment as the plaintiffs medicine but the compositions <strong>are</strong> different.”</em> A person in the market for medicine for a particular ailment can easily get confused between two similarly named products. Where the chemical compositions of such products are different, picking the wrong medicine can have adverse consequences on a person’s health if they are susceptible to side-effects from that drug. This is exactly the kind of quandary that the Supreme Court was seeking to resolve when it prescribed a stricter standard for assessing similarity between pharmaceutical trademarks.</p>

<p><strong>(Mis)application of the Public Interest Standard</strong></p>

<p>Several subsequent decisions, unfortunately, have misunderstood the context of the <em>Cadila Healthcare</em> decision. Instead of applying the stricter ‘public interest’ standard to the limited circumstances described above, they seem to have extended it to all pharmaceutical trademarks. An example of this is the Delhi High Court’s decision in [<em>Mankind Pharma v. Novakind Bio Sciences](https://web.archive.org/web/20230124115944/https:/indiankanoon.org/doc/183866955/)</em>.<em> The plaintiff, Mankind, which had several registered trademarks ending with the suffix ‘kind’, objected to the registration of the respondent’s ‘Sebakind’ trademark. As per Section 11(1) of the <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230124115944/https:/legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1999-47_0.pdf">Trademarks Act</a>, there needs to be a similarity between the marks as well as a likelihood of confusion to refuse registration. It is a <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230124115944/https:/indiankanoon.org/doc/88182074/">well-settled proposition</a> that the marks ought to be looked at in their entirety to determine similarity. Dissecting the marks to establish similarity between suffixes such as ‘kind’ is not sufficient. For instance, the judgment of the Delhi High Court in <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230124115944/https:/indiankanoon.org/doc/17509216/">*PhonePe v. Ezy Services*</a> held that ‘BharatPe’ did not infringe on the ‘PhonePe’ mark merely because their suffixes were identical. Thus, ordinarily, the plaintiff should not have succeeded in the </em>Mankind<em> case. However, the court applied the ‘public interest’ standard of </em>Cadila<em> to rule against the use of ‘Sebakind’. This was done despite the fact that the present case did not meet the specific factual criteria of </em>Cadila.* </p>

<p>Such broad- based application of the ‘public interest’ standard is especially detrimental in cases where there is a dispute between generic drugs sold under different brands. In [<em>Wyeth Holdings v. Burnet Pharmaceuticals](https://web.archive.org/web/20230124115944/https:/indiankanoon.org/doc/357841/)</em>,<em> the Bombay High Court held that </em>“merely because the two competing marks are used for drugs with the same composition that would not justify applying a lower standard of scrutiny. For, even in such a case, the public interest lies in protecting the consumer against an unwary purchase of a deceptively similar product.”* However, now that <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230124115944/https:/www.mondaq.com/india/food-and-drugs-law/588660/requirement-of-bio-equivalence-studies-for-generic-drugs--a-step-in-the-right-direction">bioequivalence studies are mandatory</a> for generic drugs, applying a strict standard to such classes of disputes would do more harm than good. It is common practice for pharmaceutical companies to name their drugs based on its active ingredients. This means that there is bound to be some level of similarity between the marks of generic substitutes. Furthermore, bioequivalence between two drugs means that they result in the same therapeutic outcomes for patients. If the core justification for trademark law is to serve as a marker of quality for the product, applying a stricter standard for goods that are virtually the same makes no sense. It would only serve to reduce competition and increase the cost of drugs, which would result in greater harm to public health.</p>

<p>Courts have increasingly gotten cognizant of such issues and have decided against applying the ‘public interest’ standard in all circumstances. For instance, in <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230124115944/https:/indiankanoon.org/doc/69035497/"><em>Astrazeneca v. Orchid Chemicals](https://web.archive.org/web/20230124115944/http:/164.100.69.66/jupload/dhc/NAC/judgement/23-09-2022/NAC23092022SC4272022_182331.pdf)</em>,<em> the court while discussing the test laid down in </em>Cadila,<em> noted that— </em>“In case of same medicine or drug this test which is the basis for considering the effect on the health and life will be redundant. Same drug having same composition will not have different side effects leading to any disastrous results.”<em> It decided against applying the stringent ‘public interest’ standard as the drugs were merely generic substitutes of each other having the same chemical compositions. Then again, the same court in its recent [</em>Fdc v. Nilrise*</a> decision relied on the ‘public interest’ standard despite the fact that the medicines in question had the same chemical composition.</p>

<p><strong>Conclusion
​</strong>
Clearly, there is a lot of confusion and contradiction in how courts have interpreted the <em>Cadila</em> decision. The author believes in a limited application of the ratio set out therein. In an era of increasing drug costs, the public interest requires that the courts commit to providing access to low-cost medicines. In fact, in cases where the courts are dealing with generic substitutes, the public interest would be better served if the courts are lenient in their application of trademark law. Consumers should not face higher costs and be led to believe that the same drugs differ in quality because they are identified by a particular trademark. Scholars in other countries have <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230124115944/https:/repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&amp;httpsredir=1&amp;article=1207&amp;context=mttlr">recognized this problem</a> and have even called for a complete abolition of pharmaceutical trademarks. While this step may be too extreme, courts must at least ensure that that they do not resort to a heavy-handed approach while dealing with pharmaceutical trademarks. They must also require parties to submit bioequivalence studies of their medicines to determine if their therapeutic outcomes are actually the same.</p>]]></content><author><name>Jindal Digest</name></author><category term="blogs" /><category term="editors" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Read our latest legal insights and analysis from expert contributors.]]></summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://jindaldigest.github.io/assets/default-post-image.jpg" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://jindaldigest.github.io/assets/default-post-image.jpg" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry></feed>